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From Piracy to Prostitution - State Forfeiture of an 
Innocent Owner's Property: Bennis v. Michigan 
Why should a person who's totally innocent, who has done 
whatever they could do to stop the crime, who has no know-
ledge of it ... be punished by having to give up their prop-
erty?1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
How confident are you that your property is safe from seizure?2 The 
United States Constitution clearly states that an individual shall not be 
deprived of property without due process of law.3 However, in order to 
gain a complete understanding of the potential limitations on your prop-
erty rights, "[i]magine owning an expensive piece of property ... [n]ow 
imagine having your property forcefully taken away from you because 
someone suspects, or pretends to suspect, that you are using the property 
in the commission of criminal acts. "4 Most people might not believe that 
this could happen in America.5 They would, however, be wrong.6 
Because traditional modes of punishment, such as fines and imprison-
ment, have proven ineffective in halting the highly profitable drug trade, 
civil forfeiture of real property has become a powerful deterrent of such 
criminal activity.7 Between 1985 and 1991, the number of federal forfei-
tures increased over eighteen times to a total of 35,295, and the amount 
deposited into the Asset Forfeiture Fund has grown from $93.7 million in 
1986 to $555.7 million in 1993.8 The profitability of this law enforcement 
* Copyright © 1997 by Charlena Toro. 
1. United States Supreme Court Transcript of Oral Argument at 40-41, 1995 WL 712350 
(Jan 11, 1995). 
2. See generally Henry Hyde, Forfeiting Our Property Rights 1-4 (1995). 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1; U.S. CaNST. amend. V. 
4. James E. Beaver et al., Civil Forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment After Austin, 19 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1 (1995). 
5. !d. at 2. 
6. ld. 
7. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2810 (1993). A forfeiture is "[a] 
comprehensive term which means a divestiture of specific property without compensation; it 
imposes a loss by the taking away of some preexisting valid right without compensation." BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 650 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted). 
8. Mary M. Cheh, Can Something This Easy, Quick, And Profitable Also Be Fair?, 39 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1994). 
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mechanism may explain why the number of civil forfeitures is escalating 
at a rapid rate. 9 
Under current forfeiture procedures, law enforcement agencies may 
seize property used in connection with criminal conduct, sell it on the 
open market, and retain the sale proceeds. 10 A significant portion of law 
enforcement agency revenue is now largely dependent on the aggressive 
pursuit of seizable property. 11 Put simply, the more property that agencies 
confiscate, the more money such agencies will receive. 12 According to a 
previous otlicial in the Justice Department's Asset Forfeiture Section, 
"the departments 'marching orders' were: '[f]orfeit, forfeit, forfeit. Get 
money, get money, get money.' "13 The government has pursued such a 
policy even to the extent of encroaching on the personal freedom of indi-
viduals who all too frequently are completely unaware of any wrongdo-
ing.l4 
Innocent and unknowing property owners commonly fall victim to 
civil forfeiture provisions. 15 Examples are prolific. 16 Paul and Ruth 
Derbacher, an elderly couple, had invited their twenty-three year old 
grandson Julian to live with them. 17 When a police search uncovered mar-
ijuana and cocaine belonging to their grandson, the Derbacher's Connect-
icut home was confiscated. 18 Similarly, Willie Jones, an innocent black 
nurseryman from Tennessee allegedly fitting the profile for a drug cou-
9. Id. at 3. 
10. Id. There are billions of civil forfeiture dollars spent without legislative controls. Hyde, 
supra note 2, at 6. Thus, law enforcement agencies have been "[s]kirting safeguards provided by 
the normal governmental appropriations process, billions of dollars worth of property and hundreds 
of millions of dollars in cash fall into the hands of police and prosecutors, then are spent (and 
often misspent) with no control or oversight by elected legislative bodies -- and little or no 
accounting to anyone, much less to the public." Id. 
11. Cheh, supra note 8, at 4. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. (citations omitted). 
14. Hyde, supra note 2, at 2. 
15. See infra notes 16-29 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 17-29 and accompanying text. 
17. William Carpenter, Reforming the Civil Drug Fmfeiture Statutes: Analysis and 
Recommendations, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (1994). Following is what happened when police 
officers raided Ruth and Paul Derbacher's Connecticut home: 
[The police] found fifteen pounds of marijuana, several ounces of cocaine, and several 
firearms, which included sawed-off shotguns fitted with bayonets. Paul and Ruth were 
arrested on charges of possession of cocaine and possession with intent to distribute. 
Their twenty-three year old grandson Julian was convicted of multiple crimes, having 
tried to burn down his girlfriend's house and having robbed a convenience store while 
dressed up as Rambo and armed with an assault rifle. At their trial, the defense 
contended that the Derbachers lived in terror of Julian and never ventured into his part 
of the house. The couple fmally settled with the government, agreeing to sell the house 
and split the proceeds. 
/d. at 1093-1094. 
18. /d. at 1090. 
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rier, had $9,600 improperly seized by Nashville police as he boarded a 
plane to buy shrubbery in Houston. 19 Likewise, Donald Scott, a million-
aire rancher, was shot and killed by Los Angeles police officers when 
they attempted to serve him with an illegal search warrant. 20 Later the 
19. !d. The following passage details the civil forfeiture abuse experienced by Willie Jones: 
[Willie Jones was] a Na~hville landscaper who in 1991 bought an airline ticket to 
Houston with cash. That prompted an airline employee to tip off the Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA) in the hope of collecting a 10 percent commission on any drug moneys 
that might be seized. The Department of Justice pays out about $24 million annually 
to such tipsters. A search of Mr. Jones revealed no drugs, but he had $9.600 in his 
wallet. A drug-sniffing dog supposedly detected traces of drugs on the money, a fact 
of slight merit because about 96 percent of all currency in circulation, whether carried 
by clergy men or <-Tack dealers, has such traces. Mr. Jones was not arrested but his 
cash, which wa~ intended for the purchase of shrubbery, wa~ confiscated. He was 
unable to post a bond for 10 percent of the money in order to mount a legal challenge 
to the fotieiture. It nearly drove him out of business. He lamented, 'I didn't know it 
was against the law for a 42-year-old black man to have money in his pocket." Jones 
had no police record and could produce documents showing that he regularly made such 
trips to buy from nurseries that demanded cash. Luckily, a distinguished lawyer who 
heard about Jones's case volunteered to represent him. As a result a federal district 
court judge in Nashville tongue-lashed the conduct of the DEA officers who took 
Jones's money and ordered them to return it. Most such ca~es do not have happy 
endings. 
Leonard W. Levy, A License To Steal: The Forfeiture Of Property, 3-4 (1996). 
In addition, Congressman Hyde articulated the following: 
Government abuse of asset fmfeiture discriminates against minority Americans, 
especially African-Americans and Hispanics. T11eir often meager property and ca~h are 
seized at a far greater rate than that of whites because those minorities are said to fit 
stereotypical drug courier profiles prepared by insensitive police. In Memphis, 75 
percent of the air travelers stopped by dT'tg police were black, yet only 4 percent of the 
flying public is black. 
Hyde, supra note 2, at 6. 
20. Carpenter, supra note 17, at 1090. The following pa~sage provides the story of Donald 
Scott: 
[Donald Scott was] a multimillionaire, who owned a two-hundred-acre ranch in Ventura 
County, California. In the wee hours of the night in 1992, thirty-one lawmen from eight 
agencies, including DEA agents and Los Angeles police, occupied the ranch and 
smashed in the door of Scott's home with a battering ram. Five officers, guns drawn, 
rushed in. Scott, groggy from sleep and a drunken stupor, grabbed his revolver and ran 
into the outer room. Officers ordered him to drop the weapon. As he lowered it, he was 
shot dead before his wife. A search of the property yielded no drugs. Nor did the 
officers find marijuana growing on it. despite a tip from an informant. Indeed, before 
the fatal raid, the California National Guard had photographed the property from the air, 
and so had the DEA. The inconclusive results had led to a furtive ground scan of the 
Scott property by the United States Border Patrol, but no marijuana wa~ found. 
Nevertheless a local judge issued a search warrant, which led to the raid on Scott's 
home and to his subsequent death. The search warrant later turned out to be illegal, 
because it lacked probable cause. A Ventura County investigation also concluded that 
the border patrol illegally trespassed on the property and that the Los Angeles County 
Sheriff's Department had been motivated by a desire to seize and fotieit the ranch for 
the benefit of the various Ia w enforcement agencies that had been involved. The 
property 'was worth millions of dollars,' said the district attorney of Ventura County, 
and the Ventura County sheriff 'was not called because Los Angeles County did not 
want to split the fotieiture proceeds with that agency.' The L.A. County sheriff 
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Ventura County District Attorney determined that one motivation for the 
search warrant was to enable the officers to find contraband to support 
the seizure of Donald Scott's million dollar property.21 Finally, Billy 
Munnerlyn's Lear jet was seized in an erroneous civil forfeiture by offi-
cers of the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA"), who caused $185,000 in 
damages and recovery costs. 22 As a result ·of these expenses, Billy 
Munnerlyn was forced into bankruptcy and is now a truck driver. 23 These 
are only four examples of civil forfeiture abuses, and "[a]s the individual 
horror stories multiply, people are realizing they could easily be the next 
victims of government run amok. "24 
conceded that before they sought a warrant they had discussed forfeiture of the property, 
as they always do whenever a large amount of money or property is implicated, but 
denied that the interest in the forfeiture dominated concern for crime. However, the 
Scotts had committed no crime, and the drug experts in the law enforcement agencies 
appear to have confused ivy with marijuana. 
Levy, supra note 19, at 1, 6-7. 
21. Carpenter, supra note 17, at 1090. 
22. Id. The story regarding Billy Munnerlyn and his experiences with the governmental 
abuse of ci vii forfeiture is as follows: 
Billy Munnerlyn, who had an air charter service, flew a passenger from Little Rock to 
Ontario, California, in 1989. DEA officers seized the passenger's luggage, finding $2.7 
million in it. Although the government dropped the arrest charges against Munnerlyn, 
who knew nothing about the drug money, it refused to return his Lear jet. He sold three 
smaller planes and his office equipment to pay $80,000 in legal fees, but his attempt 
to force the return of his jet failed when a federal district court ruled against him. The 
government offered to return the plane for $66,000, which he could not afford. He 
finally got it back for $7,000 only to discover that government agents, having ripped 
the plane apart in a futile search for drugs, caused damage of at least $50,000, for 
which the DEA is not liable. Munnerlyn declared bankruptcy, lost his business, and 
became a truck driver. 
Levy, supra note 19 at 1, 4-5. 
23. Carpenter, supra note 17, at 1090. 
24. Hyde, supra note 1, at 3. The following passages are other examples of civil forfeiture 
abuses: 
In 1988 customs agents seized the Atlantis II, an $80 million research vessel owned by 
the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution in Massachusetts. The pretext for confiscating 
the vessel was the fact that a drug-sniffing dog foUild about one one-hundredth of an 
ounce of marijuana in a crewman's shaving kit. The public outcry in this instance was 
exceptional, because of the trivial pretext for the seizure and because the oceanographic 
institution had no knowledge that a crewman used marijuana; as a result of the public 
response, the United States had to return the vessel. 
Levy, supra note 19, at 1, 2. 
Following is a similar situation: 
!d. 
Professor Craig Klein [who] was equally innocent but not as lucky. He bought a new 
sailboat for $24,000, which was being delivered to him in Jacksonville, Florida. 
Customs agents in Florida waters commonly suspect boats of carrying drugs. They 
conducted a seven-hour search of Klein's sailboat by ripping out its woodwork, 
smashing its engine., rupturing its fuel tank, and drilling thirty holes into its hull, many 
below the water line. The officers, who found no drugs, damaged the boat beyond 
repair. Klein sold it for scrap. 
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Recently, the United States Supreme Court addressed the civil forfei-
ture of an automobile in Bennis v. Michigan. 25 The automobile, a 1977 
Pontiac, was purchased jointly by John and Tina Bennis for $600.26 When 
John Bennis was arrested for committing an illicit act in the Pontiac, the 
car was seized and ultimately became the subject of a civil forfeiture ac-
tion. 27 Tina Bennis challenged the forfeiture because she had no knowl-
edge of, or involvement in, her husband's criminal activity.28 The Su-
preme Court was not persuaded by the fact that Tina Bennis, as co-owner 
of the car, was innocent, and ultimately approved the forfeiture. 29 
This Note will demonstrate the inequity of the Bennis decision, not-
ing that Tina Bennis' property interest in the Bennis family car should not 
have been forfeited. 30 This Note will further examine the government's 
recent abuse of civil forfeiture, demonstrating in itself a "long and unbro-
ken line" of examples of governmental abuse. 31 Finally, this Note will 
predict the wide spread ramifications of the Bennis decision, concluding 
that civil forfeiture reform should be embraced. 32 
II. FACTS AND HOLDING 
In September 1988, Tina and John Bennis purchased a 1977 Pontiac 
sedan for John Bennis to commute to work. 33 On October 3, 1988, Detroit 
Following is another example of the government's abuse: 
Mrs. Selena Washington ... had the misfortune of carrying a lot of cash. She was 
driving along Interstate 95 in eastern Florida on her way to buy construction materials 
to repair her home, which had been damaged by Hurricane Hugo. Interstate 95 is a 
pipeline for illegal drugs, and the sheriff's department of Volusia County makes it a 
practice of stopping suspicious-looking vehicles, often those driven by blacks because 
a majority of people who transport drug money is in fact black. The sheriff stops cars 
going south-presumably those with cash to buy controlled substances-rarely tho"e 
going north with caches of drugs. The sheriff's purpose is to hunt for cash. Within a 
few years his department confiscated about $8 million in cash believed to be narcotics 
moneys. When a deputy stopped Mrs. Washington late one night, his search of her 
purse yielded $19,000, which he confiscated a8 drug money. She protested vehemently 
and asked to be taken to the police station to clarify the matter, but he simply drove 
off. He did not even take her name. She had the nerve to follow him back to the police 
station to lodge a protest. An attorney, whom she hired to represent her, advised 
settlement because of the expense of contending a forfeiture suit. The sheriff kept 
$4,000, the lawyer $1,200, and she got back the rest. 
!d. at 2-3. 
25. 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996). 
26. !d. at 997. 
27. !d. 
28. !d. 
29. !d. at 995. 
30. See infra notes 33-111, 310-317, 324-412 and accompanying text. 
31. See infra notes 112-310, 361-412 and accompanying text. 
32. See infra notes 407-453 and accompanying text. 
33. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 997 (1996). Tina Bennis, who was a 38 year-old 
mother of five children, remained married to John Bennis after his arrest. Richard Ryan, High 
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law enforcement officers, Jacob Anthony and John Howe, initiated sur-
veillance of a woman after observing her "flagging" down passing vehi-
cles. 34 The woman, later identified as Kathy Polarchio, flagged down and 
entered the 1977 Pontiac driven by John Bennis.35 Police officers 
Anthony and Howe arrested John Bennis after observing that he and Ms. 
Polarchio were engaged in sexual activity inside the Bennis family car.36 
John Bennis was subsequently charged and convicted of violating MICH. 
COMP. LAW§ 750.338(b), which prohibits gross indecency. 37 As a result, 
a civil forfeiture action was initiated to seize the Pontiac under MICH. 
COMP. LAWS§§ 600.3801 and 600.3825. 3R 
Court Has Lively Debate Over State Case: Forfeiture Issue Involving Car Used For Prostitution 
Amuses Some Justices, Detroit News, November 30, 1995, at 12A; Richard Ryan, Court Allows 
Seizure Of Innocent Owner's Property, Detroit News, March 5, 1996 at Al. Tina Bennis worked 
a newspaper route with one of her children, in order to "make ends meet." David G. Savage, 
Innocence Punished, A.B.A. J. May 1996 at 47. Tina Bennis also cleaned office buildings and 
worked at a school cafeteria as a cook. !d. 
34. Bennis v. Michigan, 527 N.W.2d. 483, 486 (1994). "Flagging'' is how prostitutes "solicit 
business from potential customers in passing vehicles." ld. 
35. ld. 
36. Bennis v. Michigan, 504 N.W.2d 731 (1993). 
37. Bennis, 116 S.Ct. at 996. John Bennis pled guilty to a misdemeanor charge of indecency 
and was ordered to pay $250 and perform community service. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Bennis, 
116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729). 
The Michigan statute prohibiting gross indecency provides in pertinent part: 
Any male person who, in public or in private, commits or is a party to the commission 
of any act of gross indecency with a female person shall be guilty of a felony, 
punishable as provided in this section. Any female person who, in public or private, 
commit.~ or is a party to the commission of any act of gross indecency with a male 
person shall be guilty of a felony punishable as provided in this section. Any person 
who procures or attempts to procure the commission of any act of gross indecency by 
and between any male person and any female person shall be guilty of a felony as 
provided in this section. Any person convicted of a felony as provided in this section 
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 5 years, or by 
a fine of not more than $2,500.00, or if such person was at the time of the said offense 
a sexually delinquent person, may be punishable by imprisonment in the state prison 
for an indeterminate term, the minimum of which shall be 1 day and the maximum of 
which shall be life. 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.338(b) (West 1995). 
38. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 996. The Bennis family car was forfeited because according to 
Michigan law: "[a]ny building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or place used for the purpose of lewdness, 
assignation, or prostitution or gambling, or used by or kept for the use of prostitutes . . . is 
declared a nuisance ... and all ... nuisances shall be. enjoined and abated . . . . " /d.; MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3801 (West 1987). 
In addition, the abatement statute provides: 
(1) Order of abatement. If the existence of the nuisance is established in an action as 
provided in this chapter, an order of abatement shall be entered as a part of the 
judgment in the case, which order shall direct the removal from the building or place 
of all furniture, fixtures and contents therein and shall direct the sale thereof in the 
manner provided for the sale of chattels under execution .... "(2) Vehicles, sale. Any 
vehicle, boat, or aircraft found by the court to be a nuisance within the meaning of this 
chapter, is subject to the same order and judgment as any furniture, fixtures and 
contents as herein provided . . . . 
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The Wayne County prosecutor filed a civil action in the Wayne 
County Circuit Court, alleging that John Bennis had used the Bennis fam-
ily car for an act of "lewdness, assignation, or prostitution."39 According 
to the prosecutor, when the Pontiac was used for such a purpose, it be-
came an abatable nuisance. 40 Tina Bennis challenged the abatement of the 
Pontiac because she was unaware of her husband's criminal conduct. 41 
Despite Tina Bennis' lack of knowledge, the circuit court declared the 
automobile a nuisance, ordered the forfeiture, and terminated her interest 
in the automobile. 42 
Although the trial judge had the discretion to order one-half of the 
sale proceeds after costs to be paid to the innocent co-owner, the trial 
judge refused, noting that the Bennises owned another vehicle and were 
not left without transportation when the Pontiac was confiscated. 43 As a 
key factor in his decision to remit all of the sale proceeds to the State, the 
trial judge noted that "(t]here's practically nothing left minus costs in a 
situation such as this. "44 As a result, Tina and John Bennis appealed the 
circuit court's decision to the Michigan Court of Appeals. 45 
On appeal, the Bennises argued that the prosecutor failed to prove 
that Tina Bennis had knowledge of John Bennis' criminal use of the car 
and that, because only one incident occurred in the automobile, insuffi-
cient evidence existed to target the automobile for abatement as a 
nuisance. 46 The fact that the record provided no indication that Tina 
Bennis was aware of her husband's criminal use of the automobile proved 
persuasive to the court. 47 Moreover, the court of appeals held that the 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 600.3825 (West 1987). 
Kathy Polarchio, the prostitute with John Bennis when he was arrested, was arrested the 
following day for "accosting and soliciting." Bennis v. Michigan, 527 N.W. 2d. at 486. Ms. 
Polarchio had previously been arrested for this offense as well as the offenses of disorderly conduct 
and indecent and offensive conduct. /d. 
39. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 486. 
40. /d. An abatement is "[a] reduction, a decrease, or a diminution. The suspension or 
cessation, in whole or in part, of a continuing charge, such as rent." BlACK'S LAW DicriONARY 
4 (6th ed. 1990). A nuisance is "that activity which arises from unreasonable, unwarranted or 
unlawful use by a person of his own property, working obstruction or injury to right of another, 
or to the public, and producing such material annoyance, inconvenience and discomfort that law 
will presume resulting damage." /d. at 1065. (citations omitted). 
41. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997. 
42. /d. at 996. The Michigan Statute provides that "[p]roof of knowledge of the existence 
of the nuisance on the part of the defendant~ or any of them, is not required." MICH. COMP. ANN. 
LAWS § 600.3815(2) (West 1987). 
43. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997. 
44. /d. 
45. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d at 732. 
46. /d. at 733. 
47. /d. at 732-33. 
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prosecutor had the burden of proving that Tina Bennis was aware of the 
vehicle's criminal use in order for her interest to be abated.48 
In addition, the court of appeals stated that one criminal incident was 
insufficient to qualify the automobile as an abatable nuisance. 49 The court 
of appeals reasoned that "[j]ust as one incident of prostitution does not 
create a brothel out of a family hotel, neither does one isolated incident of 
prohibited conduct in a vehicle necessarily make the vehicle a 
nuisance. "50 
The Bennises also contended that the prosecutor did not bring the car 
within the scope of the abatement statute because he failed to 
demonstrate that an act of "lewdness, assignation, or prostitution" 
occurred in the automobile. 51 The court of appeals accepted this line of 
reasoning because John Bennis was convicted of gross indecency, not an 
act of "lewdness, assignation, or prostitution."52 Furthermore, the court of 
appeals noted that insufficient evidence existed to prove that the incident 
involving John Bennis and Ms. Polarchio included the payment of 
money. 53 After noting the absence of a proven exchange of money, the 
court of appeals concluded that John Bennis' behavior amounted to gross 
indecency, not an act of "lewdness, assignation, or prostitution."54 For 
these reasons, the court of appeals reversed the district court's decision, 
holding the forfeiture improper. 55 The State appealed the court of 
appeals' decision to the Michigan Supreme Court. 56 
On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the holding of the 
court of appeals, concluding that the Bennis family car was an abatable 
nuisance as a matter of law.57 Upon review of the statute, the supreme 
court concluded that evidence of a money exchange was unnecessary 
when the circumstances clearly indicated that the sexual act was in ex-
change for money. 58 The supreme court noted as "particularly persuasive 
the fact that Mr. Bennis engaged in this act with a known prostitute in an 
48. Id. at 732. 
49. ld. at 733. 
50. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d at 734. 
51. ld. The prosecution conceded in its brief that the "defendant John Bennis was charged 
only with gross indecency, and further admits that there is no evidence that Mr. Bennis paid or 
intended to pay Ms. Polarchio." Id. at 735. 
52. Id. at 734. 
53. ld. at 735. 
54. ld. at 735. 
55. Bennis. 116 S. Ct. at 995. 
56. Bennis, 527 N.W. 2d at 483. 
57. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 996. 
58. Bemris, 527 N.W. 2d at 486. One consequence of the nuisance theory articulated by the 
Michigan Supreme Court "is that the very same offense, committed in the very same car, would 
not render the car forfeitable if it were parked in a different part of Detroit such as the affluent 
Palmer Woods area." Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1006. 
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area reputed for illicit activity," and thus concluded that the Bennis car 
was properly abatable. 59 
In light of precedent, the Michigan Supreme Court also stated that the 
unavailability of an innocent-owner defense in Michigan was constitu-
tionally inconsequential. 60 The supreme court reinstated the forfeiture of 
the Pontiac, noting that the law permits the confiscation of an innocent 
owner's property unless that property was stolen or used without the 
owner's authorization. 61 Tina Bennis subsequently appealed the Michigan 
Supreme Court's ruling to the United States Supreme Court. 62 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine 
whether the forfeiture violated Tina Bennis' constitutional rights under 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. 63 
Tina Bennis maintained that the forfeiture was unconstitutional because 
she did not know that her husband would use the family car in an illegal 
manner. 64 Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held 
that a "long and unbroken line" of cases provided that an innocent 
owner's property may be forfeited if the property was used illegally.65 
Justice Rehnquist stated that even though Tina Bennis was unaware of 
her husband's illicit conduct, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not insulate her against civil forfeiture. 66 
As support for her constitutional challenge, Tina Bennis relied on an 
excerpt from a case cited by the Bennis majority, which provided that "it 
would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of ... an owner who 
proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful 
activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to 
prevent the proscribed use of his property."67 Upon the concession by 
Tina Bennis that the passage was mere dicta, Justice Rehnquist noted that 
"[i]t is to the holdings of our cases, rather than their dicta, that we must 
attend."68 Justice Rehnquist further negated Tina Bennis' argument by 
59. Bennis, 529 N.W. 2d at 488. 
60. !d. at 494. 
61. Gary Heinlein, Wife Wants Car Back; Appeals to High Court; County Seized Vehicle 
After Her Husband Was Caught With Prostitute, The Detroit News, June 6, 1995 at 04. 
62. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (No. 94-8729). 
63. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Michigan 
Supreme Court determination with a 5-4 decision. !d. at 996. Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion 
of the court, in which Justices O'Connor and Scalia joined. !d. Justices Thomas and Ginsburg 
wrote concurring opinions. !d. Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion which was joined by 
Justices Souter and Breyer. Justice Kennedy filed an additional dissenting opinion. !d. 
64. !d. at 998. 
65. !d. 
66. !d. at 999. 
67. !d. (quoting Calera-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 945 S. Ct. 2080, 2094-95 
(1974)). 
68. !d. at 999. (citations omitted). 
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explaining the value of civil forfeiture as a deterrent. 69 Justice Rehnquist 
maintained that when property is seized, criminal conduct is deterred be-
cause it prevents the further illicit use of the property and imposes an 
economic penalty on the owner, "thereby rendering illegal conduct unprof-
itable. "70 
In addition to asserting the innocent owner's defense, Tina Bennis 
argued that the Michigan Supreme Court's decision was a violation of the 
rights conferred to her under the Takings Clause of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments.71 The majority also rejected this challenge, noting 
that the State cannot be required to compensate an owner for property 
that the State has lawfully acquired under authority other than that of em-
inent domain.72 The majority concluded, just as it had seventy-five years 
earlier, that the cases which bind the Supreme Court are "too t1rmly fixed 
in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now dis-
placed. "73 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas stated that no 
bright line provides "what property can be forfeited as a result of what 
wrongdoing."74 Thus, there is confusion concerning both the scope of the 
property which may be seized and the type of wrongdoing for which for-
feiture may be imposed.75 Justice Thomas further noted the significance 
of these parameters as the sole criteria on which the State's authority to 
confiscate property rests.76 In circumstances in which an innocent co-
owner is involved, Justice Thomas stated that limitations should be ap-
plied strictly and should adhere to historical standards for determining 
whether property is the instrumentality of a crime.77 Justice Thomas cTiti-
cized, however, the fact that Tina Bennis failed to argue that the Pontiac 
was not an instrumentality of John Bennis' crime, and as a result 
concluded that she was not entitled to such strict limitations.78 
Justice Thomas also recognized that the State's characterization of 
the Pontiac as an abatable nuisance was in part to prevent John Bennis 
69. Id. at 1000. 
70. ld. 
71. Id. 
72. ld. The United States Supreme Court held that the forfeiture of Tina Bennis' property 
interest in the car "was not a taking of private property for public use in violation of the takings 
clause." ld. at 994. 
73. ld. at 1000. (quoting J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 25 U.S. 505 
(1921)). 
74. /d. at 1002. (Thomas, J., concurring). 
75. ld. 
76. /d. Justice Thomas stated that it was unclear to him "what it means to 'use' property 
for crime under civil forfeiture laws." /d. 
77. Id. at 1002. (Thomas, J., concurring). 
78. Id. 
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from using the car for further illicit activity.79 Justice Thomas noted that 
under a different statutory procedure the Bennis car might have been de-
stroyed, thus giving the State a plausible argument that the order was re-
medial and therefore not compensable. 80 Justice Thomas stated that even 
though the State ordered the car sold instead of destroyed, that decision 
did not substantially change the remedial nature of the State's action. 81 
Justice Thomas further noted that if the forfeiture of the car could be 
properly labeled remedial, problems stemming from the punishment of an 
innocent owner would not arise. 82 
Justice Thomas concluded that even though the seizure of an innocent 
owner's property is inequitable, the statute was nevertheless 
constitutional due to historical precedent and the wide acceptance of re-
lated laws.83 Justice Thomas warned, however, that if improperly utilized, 
seizure could be wielded like a roulette wheel, used to raise revenue from 
innocent and unsuspecting owners who are unaware that their property is 
being misused, or to punish individuals who associate with criminals, 
rather than as an element of a fair and impartial system of justice. 84 In 
addition, Justice Thomas articulated that "[t]his case is ultimately a re-
minder that the Federal Constitution does not prohibit everything that is 
inten~ely undesirable."85 
Justice Ruth Bader Gin~burg wrote a concurring opinion in which she 
noted that John and Tina Bennis owned the forfeited Pontiac jointly and 
that John Bennis had Tina Bennis' consent to use the car. 86 Justice 
Ginsburg agreed with the majority that half of the sale proceeds should 
not be remitted to Tina Bennis. 87 Moreover, because the car was so inex-
pensive, virtually no money would remain after court costs were deducted 
from the sale proceeds to pay Tina Bennis for her interest in the vehicle. 88 
Justice Ginsburg noted that because the Bennises also owned a 1984 Ford 
van, the forfeiture of the Pontiac did not leave them without transporta-
tion. 89 In addition, Justice Ginsburg commented that "Michigan, in short, 
has not embarked on an experiment to punish 'innocent' third parties. 
79. !d. Civil forfeiture of property "without proof of the owner's wrongdoing, merely 
because it was 'used' in or was an 'instrumentality' of crime has been permitted in England, and 
this country, both before and after the adoption of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." !d. 
80. !d. (Thomas, J ., concurring). 
81. !d. 
82. !d. 
83. !d. at 1004. 
84. !d. at 1003. 
85. !d. at 1001-1002. 
86. !d. at 1003. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
87. !d. 
88. !d. Justice Ginsburg recognized that the trial judge could have remitted half of the sale 
proceeds to Tina Bennis, based on her lack of criminal culpability. !d. 
89. !d. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
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Nor do we condone any such experiment. Michigan has decided to deter 
Johns from using cars they own (or co-own) to contribute to neighbor-
hood blight, and that abatement endeavor hardly warrants this court's dis-
approbation. "90 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Jus-
tices David Souter and Steven Breyer, criticized the State's ability to 
seize a vehicle, or for that matter an airplane or hotel, simply because one 
customer possessed contraband on the premises without the owner's 
knowledge.91 In addition, Justice Stevens stated that no real connection 
existed between the forfeited property in this case and the illegal act per-
formed.92 Specifically, since the Bennis family car was not needed to ef-
fectuate the crime of solicitation, Justice Stevens argued that this lack of 
nexus distinguished the present case from historical precedent. 93 Justice 
Stevens emphasized Tina Bennis' complete lack of culpability and articu-
lated the following: 
For centuries prostitutes have been plying their trade on other 
people's property. Assignations have occurred in palaces, luxury 
hotels, cruise ships, college dormitories, truck stops, back alleys, 
and back seats. A profession of this vintage has provided govern-
ments with countless opportunities to use novel weapons to cur-
tail abuses. As far as I am aware, however, it was not until 1988 
that any State decided to experiment with the punishment of 
innocent third parties by confiscating property in which, a single 
transaction with a prostitute has been consummated. 94 
Justice Stevens also criticized the State's attempt to characterize the 
seizure of the Pontiac as exclusively remedial and not punitive. 95 Justice 
Stevens noted, however, that even if this argument was valid, the forfei-
ture would still be excessive. 96 Moreover, Justice Stevens stated that the 
majority itself conceded that the forfeiture was, at least in part, punitive.97 
90. !d. 
91. Id. at 1003-1004. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens contended the following: 
The state surely may impose strict obligations on the owners of airlines, hotels, stadiums 
and vehicles to exercise a high degree of care to prevent others from making illegal use 
of their property, but neither logic nor history support~ the Court's apparent a.~sumption 
that their complete innocence imposes no constitutional impediment to the seizure of 
their property simply because it provided the locus for a criminal transaction. 
ld. at 1004. 
92. !d. at 1004. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
93. !d. at 1005-06, 1007. 
94. !d. at 1003. 
95. ld. at 1006. 
96. ld. 
97. !d. at 1006-1007. 
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In fact, at an earlier stage in this case, the State "unequivocally argued 
that confiscation of automobiles in the circumstances of this case 'is swift 
and certain punishment of the voluntary vice consumer.' "98 Therefore, 
Justice Stevens concluded that any argument that this forfeiture was not 
punishment was simply not plausible.99 
Although the majority insisted that an owner of property is strictly 
liable for illegal activity for which that property has been used, Justice 
Stevens emphasized that the Supreme Court has previously recognized an 
exception for individuals who are truly blameless. 100 Justice Stevens criti-
cized the majority for ignoring the possible application of an exception in 
the present case without explanation or comment."101 Because Tina 
Bennis was ignorant of her husband's criminal intentions, and certainly 
not aware that her husband would use the family car to solicit prostitu-
tion, Justice Stevens reasoned that the profound unfairness of this particu-
lar seizure made it unconstitutional. 102 
Justice Stevens also criticized the majority's attempt to characterize 
the instant case as one of vicarious liability. 103 As support for this criti-
cism, Justice Stevens noted the majority's failure to acknowledge that an 
employer is exonerated from vicarious liability when its employee ven-
tures off on a "frolic."104 In addition, Justice Stevens favored the applica-
tion of an analysis which would place property that is subject to forfeiture 
into one of three categories: pure contraband, proceeds of criminal activ-
ity, and instrumentalities utilized in the commission of a crime. 105 Under 
this analysis, Justice Stevens concluded that forfeiture of the Bennis car 
was improper. 106 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, in a separate dissenting opinion, argued 
against the majority's analogous application of admiralty law to 
situations involving automobiles. 107 As support for his contention that the 
analogy was improper, Justice Kennedy stated that forfeiture based in 
admiralty law sought to punish owners located on the other side of the 
world who would have otherwise been outside the limited reach of the 
law .108 Justice Kennedy noted that automobiles are a "practical 
necessity," and unlike sea-faring vessels, criminal acts involving automo-
98. !d. at 1007. 
99. !d. 
100. !d. 
101. !d. 
102. !d. at 1008, 1010. 
103. !d. at 1009. 
104. !d. 
105. /d. at 1008. 
106. !d. at 1004-1005. 
107. /d. at 1011. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
108. /d. at 1010. 
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biles usually have only a tangential connection to the vehicle itself. 109 In 
addition, Justice Kennedy criticized the State's position that a co-owner's 
interest in property can be so insignificant as to be outside the law's pro-
tection.110 Thus, according to Justice Kennedy, the seizure involved in 
this case failed to achieve the minimum standard of constitutional protec-
tion required by the Due Process Clause. 111 
III. BACKGROUND 
Civil forfeiture is premised on a legal fiction which personifies prop-
erty.u2 Under this ''personification theory," objects can be guilty of crimi-
nal conduct. 113 Guilty objects may be subject to various forms of punish-
ment, including civil forfeiture. 114 The theory that the object is the guilty 
thing is as old as the Old Testament, is rooted in medieval doctrine, and 
has historically been applied in admiralty law. 115 In the Old Testament, 
inanimate objects and animals could be considered guilty of wrongdo-
ing. 116 In medieval times, deodands were forfeited to the crown. 117 In ad-
miralty law, ships and cargo were seized for the failure to pay customs 
duties. 118 Thus, civil forfeiture is an ancient concept which has been re-
kindled in American courts by what is commonly referred to today as 
"the war on drugs."119 
A Deodands 
A medieval English writer once stated that, "[w]here a man killeth 
another with the sword of John at Stile, the sword shall be forfeit as 
deodand, and yet no default is in the owner.''12° Civil forfeiture began in 
this spirit, and in this spirit civil forfeiture has thrived. 121 Deodand, de-
rived from the Latin phrase "deo dandum" (meaning "given to God") was 
described in the Book of Exodus: "[i]f an ox gore a man or a woman that 
they die, the ox shall be surely stoned and its flesh shall not be eaten."122 
109. !d. at 1011. 
110. !d. 
111. !d. 
112. Hyde, supra note 2. at 17. 
113. !d. 
114. !d. 
115. !d. at viii. 
116. !d. 
117. Hyde, supra note 2, at 17. 
118. !d. 
119. !d. at vii. 
120. Levy, supra note 19, at 8. 
121. !d. at 7. 
122. !d. (citations omitted). 
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The Greeks of Periclean Athens believed that inanimate objects could 
have personalities and be possessed by the Furies of mythology. 123 Under 
their belief system, if an object killed a person then the accused object 
could be formally tried, convicted, and banished to protect Athens from 
pollution. 124 Along this line, Plato wrote the following: 
And if any lifeless thing deprive a man of life, except in the case 
of a thunderbolt or other fatal dart sent from the gods-whether a 
man is killed by lifeless objects falling upon him or his falling on 
them, the nearest of kin shall appoint the nearest neighbor to be a 
judge and thereby acquit himself and the whole family of guilt. 
And he shall cast forth the guilty thing beyond the border. 125 
In theory, a deodand was an object seized and given to God for the 
benefit of the community. 126 However, in reality, the seized property went 
to the English Crown. 127 The value of the deodand was forfeited to the 
King under the assumption that the money would provide a mass to be 
held in honor of the dead person's soul or to ensure that the deodand was 
put to a charitable purpose. 128 In England, the procedure used against an 
accused object was an in rem proceeding, which literally means "against 
the thing."129 After a guilty object was personified and considered tainted, 
the property could not lose this stigma, regardless of subsequent owner-
ship.13o 
Moreover, the nineteenth century laws of England provided that if a 
bull injured a person, then the bull would be targeted for retribution. 131 
Likewise, if a tree fell on a man and he died as a result, his relatives could 
avenge his death by cutting down the tree and scattering the bark chips. 132 
If a man drowned in a well, then the well could he t1lled. 133 Or, if a per-
son was stung to death by bees, the whole bee colony could he suffocated 
in their hive. 134 
123. !d. at 9. 
124. !d. 
125. !d. 
126. Levy, supra note 19, at 7. 
127. !d. 
128. Ca1ero-To1edo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 (1974). 
129. Hyde, supra note 2, at 18. 
130. !d. 
131. Levy, supra note 19, at 10. 
132. !d. 
133. !d. 
134. !d. There Wa$ a notion that "[the bees] were demonically possessed or would not have 
otherwise have committed the crime .... " !d. 
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Little or no consideration was given to the guilt or innocence of the 
owner of the tree, the well or the bee hive. 135 The guilt, therefore, 
attached to the guilty thing which had allegedly done the wrongful act. 136 
This guilt provided the basis for the theory that an object which caused an 
accident, whether an animal or a tree, was thereby tainted. 137 These prin-
ciples formed the legal foundation that disregards a property owner's in-
nocence as an irrelevant consideration. 138 And as societies continued to 
develop, so did the idea that those in authority should receive compensa-
tion from the owners of guilty objects. 139 
By the eighteenth century, however, situations involving deodands 
were still uncommon in America. 140 Even so, the doctrine of deodands 
established that owners of "guilty" property were properly punishable 
because forfeiture inspired better care by the property owner. 141 In fact, 
William Blackstone, a well-known legal analyst, believed that events 
leading to accidental death, were in part, a result of the property owner's 
negligence. 142 However, "[t]he notion that deodands could be justified as 
an inducement to better care or as a deterrent to negligence continued 
until the frequency of deaths from accident revealed its emptiness."143 
The increase of accidental deaths and the law's failure to provide re-
dress for victims' families forced Parliament to create an alternative to 
the deodand. 144 The Parliament thus decided to eliminate deodands and 
vest a cause of action in victims' survivors. 145 By 1846, deodands were 
abolished in England without ever entering the mainstream of American 
law. 146 The basic theories supporting deodands, however, established the 
foundation of current civil forfeiture law in the United States. 147 
In examining the personification of guilty objects, the United States 
Supreme Court has held that the law attributes "to the property a certain 
personality, a power of complicity and guilt in the wrong. In such cases 
135. Levy, supra note 19, at 10. 
J 36. ld.; Hyde, supra note 2, at 18. 
137. Id. During the middle ages, animals could be subjected to capital punishment if 
"convicted" of a crime. Levy, supra note 19, at 11. Ecclesiastical courts of the medieval church 
tried accused animals as if they were rational creatures. In some instances, animals would be 
dressed up in human clothing before a death sentence was imposed. The persecution of these 
animals was a symbolic gesture to appease the victim and God. Jd. 
138. Levy, supra note 19, at 10. 
139. Jd. at 11. 
140. !d. at 14. The rarity of deodands may have been attributed to the colonists' reluctance 
to make the crown the beneficiary of the deodands. Id. 
141. Levy, supra note 19, at 15. 
142. /d. 
143. /d. at 17. 
144. ld. at 18. 
145. /d. at 19. 
146. !d. 
147. /d. at 19. 
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there is some analogy to the law of deodand by which a personal chattel 
that was the immediate cause of the death of any reasonable creature was 
forfeited."148 Inanimate objects have been forfeited under the theory that 
the object is guilty of the wrongdoing. 149 For example, in United States v. 
One 1963 Cadillac Coup de Ville Two Door, 150 the government sued a 
Cadillac Coup de Ville as though the vehicle itself were guilty of a 
crime. 151 Similarly, in United States v. One 6.5 mm. Mannlicher-Carcano 
Military Rifle, 152 the government sued the firearm used in the assassina-
tion of President John F. Kennedy under the theory that the ri11e was a 
species of a deodand. 153 
B. Admiralty Cases: Pirating 
Admiralty law covers maritime matters that relate to commercial sea 
traffic and navigation, and is rooted in the English fiction which personi-
fies inanimate objects with life and personal responsibility. 154 Admiralty 
law is also considered "the immediate wellspring of American civil asset 
forfeiture law and procedure."155 Because American civil forfeiture law 
was influenced by the maritime law of England, civil forfeitures in Amer-
ica require the use of admiralty law in forfeiture cases. 156 Admiralty cases 
that influenced civil forfeitures in America have been well documented, 
most notably by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who long ago stated that 
a ship may be the most living of inanimate things because everyone as-
signs a gender to vessels. 157 In addition, Justice Holmes rationalized his 
position: 
[t]he ship is the only security available in dealing with foreigners, 
and rather than send one's own citizens to search for a remedy 
abroad in strange courts, it is easy to seize the vessel and satisfy 
the claim at home, leaving the foreign owners to get their indem-
nity as they may be able. 158 
148. !d. at 8. 
149. !d. 
150. 250 F. Supp. 183, 185 (1996). 
151. Levy, supra note 19, at 7. 
152. 250 F. Suw. 410 (N.D. Tex), rev'd sub nom. King v. United States, 364 F.2d 235, 236 
(5th Cir. 1966). 
153. Levy, supra note 19, at 7. 
154. Hyde, supra note 2, at 20. 
155. ld. 
156. !d. 
157. !d. at 21. 
158. !d. at 22. 
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The United States Supreme Court addressed civil forfeiture under 
admiralty law in The Palmyra. 159 The Palmyra, which was a private 
armed vessel, had allegedly attacked a United States ship and the citizens 
on board, resulting in the death of one man and the injury of six others. 160 
Subsequent to this confrontation, the Palmyra was captured by the United 
States vessel, the Grampus. 161 After the Palmyra was captured, she was 
sent to a Charleston, South Carolina port where a libel action was filed, 
alleging that the Palmyra committed acts of piratical aggression. 162 
The United States Attorney General alleged that the Palmyra was not 
commissioned lawfully or regularly, and was therefore a piratical ves-
sel. 163 The attorney general further contended that the seizure was fully 
justified for three reasons: 1) the Palmyra had committed acts of piratical 
aggression; 2) the Palmyra searched American ships in violation of a 
treaty between the United States and Spain; and 3) the captain of the Pal-
myra gave unsatisfactory explanations for these suspicious 
circumstances. 164 
Counsel for the Palmyra asserted that the charges of piratical aggres-
sion were not made with sufficient precision. 165 The Palmyra character-
ized the situation as a hostile attack by a United States vessel of war 
against a foreign vessel which was known to be regularly 
commissioned. 166 Counsel further contended that the Palmyra was cap-
tured even after the vessel's character had been satisfactorily 
explained. 167 
The District Court of South Carolina restored the Palmyra to its own-
ers, but denied damages. 168 Both parties appealed this decision to the Cir-
159. 25 U.S. 1 (1827). The Palmyra wa~ decided under an act of Congress which sought to 
protect United States conm1erce and to punish piracy. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1 (1827). 
160. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 1-2. 
161. !d. at 2. 
162. !d. The act~ of "piratical aggression, search, depredation, restraint, and seizure had been 
attempted and made upon the high seas in and pon [sic] ... the United States vessels, the 
Coquette and the Jeune Eugenie, and upon vessels of various other nations." ld. When the Palmyra 
was captured, the Palmyra was armed with cannons, cannonades, and a one hundred man crew. 
!d. at 3. 
163. ']be Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 4. The Palmyra, an armed vessel, was originally commissioned 
by the King of Spain; when it' commission expired, the vessel's commission wa~ renewed for three 
additional months by the Port Captain of Porto Rico, not by the King of Spain. ld. The Attorney 
General for the United States argued that "a commission to cruise is a delegated authority, and can 
only pr,>eeed h·om the sovereign. Subordinate agents may be employed to execute the will of the 
sovere1gn in that respect, but the actual delegation of the power must clearly appear." !d. 'The 
Attorney General thus contended that the extension granted by the lieutenant was without the 
proper authority from the king, making it a piratical vessel. !d. 
164. !d. at 6. 
165. ld. at 7. 
166. !d. 
167. !d. 
168. Jd. at 8. 
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cuit Court of South Carolina which reversed in part and affirmed in part 
the district court's decision. 169 After the circuit court returned the 
Palmyra to its owners and awarded $10,288 in damages, both parties filed 
an appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 170 The Supreme Court af-
tlrmed the circuit court's restoration of the Palmyra to its owners, but 
denied damages. 171 Justice Joseph Story, writing for the majority, 
explained that "[t]he thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or 
rather the offence [sic] is attached primarily to the thing."172 
Seventeen years later, the United States Supreme Court again referred 
to the guilt or innocence of the vessel, rather than that of the owner. 173 A 
United States vessel of war seized the Malek Adhel based on reports that 
the Malek Adhel was stopping ships and engaging in piratical aggression 
and sea robbery. 174 The Malek Adhel was subsequently sent to a Balti-
more, Maryland port for adjudication and forfeiture proceedings. 175 The 
case of Harmony v. United States116 resulted when the ship's owner, Peter 
Harmony protested the seizure of his ship, the Malek Adhel. 177 Harmony 
maintained, and the United States conceded, that Harmony neither con-
templated nor authorized the acts of the Malek Adhel' s captain. 178 
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland con-
denmed the vessel, but restored the cargo to the owners. 179 Both parties 
then appealed the district court's decision directly to the United States 
Supreme Court. 180 The United States Attorney General argued that the 
169. Id. at 8-9. 
170. Id. at 9. 
171. Id. at 18. The United States Supreme Court noted that no damages are to be awarded 
to a vessel brought into port on charges of piratical aggression. Id. at 6. While a final claim of 
damages had been submitted; the clerk of the circuit court failed to transmit an accurate record. 
/d. at 9. The United States Supreme Court originally dismissed the claim because no final claim 
of damages had been submitted, but reinstated the claim after it was discovered. !d. at 3. The 
Justices of the Supreme Court were divided in opinion, and thus, "according to the known practice 
of the Court ... ," the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decree of acquittal. Id. at 15. 
172. /d. at 14. 
173. Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. 210, 227 (1844). 
174. Id. at 211. 
175. Id. On June 30, 1840, the Malek Adhel sailed from New York to California, and was 
commanded by Joseph Nunez. Id. at 210. The vessel, armed with a cannon, ammunition, pistols, 
and daggers, stopped vessels on the high seas. Id. at 210-211. On August 21, 1840, the Malek 
Adhel was seized by the Enterprise, a United States vessel of war under an act of Congress 
designed to protect commerce and punish piracy. Id. at 211. 
176. 43 U.S. 210 (1844). 
177. Id. at 211. 
178. Id. The United States admitted that the equipment on board the Malek qualified as the 
usual equipment necessary for the voyage on which the Malek embarked. Id. 
179. Harmony, 43 U.S. at 211. 
180. !d. at 229. Additional evidence was given in the form of a deposition, which was 
corroborated by two different persons. !d. at 212. The witness, John Meyer, gave an account of 
the voyage, highlighting Captain Nunez's bizarre and belligerent behavior. !d. at 212-13. Several 
circumstances included the captain instructing his crew not to speak English to any crew member 
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Malek Adhel' s action..<; were piratical under an Act of Congress of March 
3, 1819. 181 Harmony maintained that the acts complained of were not pi-
ratical in nature and, even if the ship was brought within the scope of the 
act, the vessel should not have been condemned because he never partici-
pated in or authorized such piratical acts. 182 
The Supreme Court condemned the vessel, but restored the cargo to 
the owner, holding that the act does not address the property owner, but 
rather the guilt of the vessel or thing. 183 In fact, according to the act, the 
only facts required to be proven were that the Malek Adhel was an armed 
vessel, and that she committed a piratical aggression. 184 In fact, the Su-
preme Court noted that if Congress intended to create an exception for 
innocent owners, it would have left the courts with some discretion. 185 
The Supreme Court stated that because Congress did not leave the courts 
with this discretion, it did not intend to provide an exception for innocent 
owners. 186 
The Supreme Court further noted that, although it is inequitable to 
punish an innocent owner, the court must adhere to Congress' goal of 
destroying the means used to facilitate crime. 187 The Supreme Court con-
cluded that "the acts of the master and crew ... bind the interest of the 
owner of the ship, whether he be innocent or guilty; and he impliedly sub-
mits to whatever the law denounces as a forfeiture .... "188 
C. Contraband Cases: Manufacturing 
In an illegal manufacturing case, the United States Supreme Court 
again articulated that a civil forfeiture was aimed at the object instead of 
the property owner. 189 In Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 190 a prop-
erty owner leased his premises to a lessee in order to operate a distill-
ery.191 The lessee was subsequently charged with failing to keep the re-
quired accounting records, making false entries with intent to defraud the 
of the Sullivan, an approaching ship. ld. at 213. After an exchange with the Sullivan, the Malek 
Adhel then sailed away and fired a shot at her. /d. 
181. Harmony, 43 U.S. at 211-12. 
182. ld. at 230. 
183. !d. at 227. 
184. /d. 
185. Jd. 
186. /d. at 227. Although it might seem unjust to "punish the innocent for the guilty ... the 
object of Congress was to stop the crime by breaking up the means of committing it." ld. 
187. ld. at 227. 
188. ld. at 234. 
189. Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 403 (1877). 
190. 96 U.S. 395 (1877). 
191. Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 395. 
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government of taxes, and refusing to produce records when requested. 192 
Although the property owner maintained his ignorance of the lessee's tax 
evading activities, an order of condemnation was nevertheless entered by 
the Circuit Court for the District of Iowa against the property owner and 
the lessee. 193 The circuit court held that it was unnecessary to prove that 
the owner was aware of the crime in order for the seizure to be proper. 194 
The circuit court further stated that if one knowingly rents one's property 
to a wrongdoer, then one must suffer the consequences of the law. 195 As 
support for this statement, the circuit court reasoned that an owner im-
pliedly submits to the consequences of the law if his property is used ille-
gally because "the law places him on the same footing as if he were the 
distiller. .. "196 The property owner subsequently filed a writ of error and 
removed the action to the United States Supreme Court. 197 
On appeal, the property owner argued that the circuit court erred by 
instructing the jury that they were not required to find that the owner was 
implicated in the lessee's activities in order to return a verdict for the 
government. 198 The United States Supreme Court noted, however, that the 
property owner "appear[ed] to have assumed, as the theory of the defence 
[sic] to the information, that he was the accused party and that he was on 
trial."199 The Supreme Court further stated that the information was not 
aimed at the property owner, but rather at the distillery, stating that "the 
offence [sic] ... is attached primarily to the distillery, and the real and 
personal property in connection with the same, without any regard what-
soever to the personal misconduct or responsibility of the owner. "200 
Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that condemnation of the distillery 
was proper. 201 
D. Contraband Cases: Transporting 
Two courts have addressed civil forfeiture law as it applies to the 
transportation of contraband in automobiles. 202 In J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-
Grant Co. v. United States, 203 for example, the Grant Company sold a 
192. !d. at 396. 
193. !d. at 395, 397. 
194. !d. at 399. 
195. !d. 
196. !d. at 399. 
197. !d. at 397. 
19 8. !d. at 398. 
199. !d. at 399. 
200. !d. at 401. 
201. !d. at 404. 
202. See infra notes 203-232 and accompanying text. 
203. 254 u.s. 505 (1921). 
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Hudson automobile to a taxicab driver, J.G. Thompson, but retained title 
to the vehicle as security for the unpaid balance. 204 When J. G. Thompson 
was caught transporting moonshine, the taxicab was seized, even though 
the Grant Company was unaware of the purchaser's criminal activity. 205 
The Grant Company challenged the forfeiture as a violation of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 206 In the District Court of the 
United States for the Northern District of Georgia, the jury concluded 
that the automobile, in essence, was itself the guilty thing. 207 As a result 
of the jury's verdict, the district court ordered the automobile's seizure. 208 
The district court denied the Grant Company's motion for a new trial, and 
the Grant Company subsequently appealed.209 On appeal, the United 
States Supreme Court concluded that "whether the reason for . . . the 
challenged forfeiture scheme be artificial or real, it is too firmly fixed in 
the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now 
displaced."210 The Supreme Court reasoned that because the owner had 
entrusted the property to the wrongdoer, the owner was partly responsible 
and thus properly punishable. 211 Consequently, the Supreme Court held 
that "[i ]t is the illegal use that is the material consideration . . . the guilt 
or innocence of its owner being accidenta1."212 Thus, the Supreme Court 
held that because the automobile was used to facilitate the crime, it was 
the proper object of condemnation. 213 
The United States Supreme Court also addressed civil forfeiture in 
another case applying to automobiles. 214 In Van Oster v. United States,215 
Stella Van Oster purchased an automobile from a local car dealer in 
Finney County, Kansas. 216 As partial consideration for the purchase, Ms. 
Van Oster permitted the car dealer to retain the automobile for use in the 
dealership. 217 Clyde Brown, an associate of the car dealer, was frequently 
permitted to use the automobile. 218 Ms. Van Oster was aware of Brown's 
204. J.W. Gold~mith, Jr.-Grant Co., v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 508-509 (1921). 
205. Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 509. 
206. ld. 
207. ld. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. 
210. Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 511. (citations omitted). 
211. ld. (citations omitted). 
212. Id. at 513. 
213. Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 513. The Supreme Court did, however, reserve opinion 
on whether the "guilty" object theory may be extended to stolen property or property taken without 
the owner's consent. Id. at 512. 
214. Van Oster v. United States, 272 U.S. 465 (1926). 
215. ld. 
216. ld. at 465-466. 
217. ld. 
218. ld. at 466. 
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use of the automobile, but unaware of any illegal activity accompanying 
that use. 219 When Brown was arrested and charged with illegally trans-
porting intoxicating liquor in the car, the State sought the forfeiture and 
sale of the automobile. 220 Ms. Van Oster intervened in the forfeiture ac-
tion, arguing that her interest in the vehicle should not have been 
forfeited because she was unaware of the automobile's criminal use. 221 
The District Court of Kansas nevertheless entered an order of forfei-
ture.222 Ms. Van Oster appealed this holding to the Kansas Supreme 
Court. 223 
On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the district court's 
decision. 224 The supreme court stated that the Kansas civil forfeiture stat-
ute authorized the seizure of an innocent owner's property if it was en-
trusted to a lawbreaker.225 Ms. Van Oster maintained that this interpreta-
tion of the statute violated rights conferred to her under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.226 The supreme court rejected Ms. 
Van Oster's argument, reasoning that the state may exercise its police 
powers to seize property used in violation of Kansas' laws. 227 According 
to the supreme court, the forfeiture was constitutional in this case, despite 
Ms. Van Oster's lack of knowledge. 228 Ms. Van Oster filed a writ of error 
to the United States Supreme Court.229 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court noted that because the 
car was misused by the seller, the forfeiture was proper. 230 Ms. Van Oster 
maintained that the car's criminal use was without her knowledge or con-
sent. 231 The Supreme Court rejected her argument, holding that no signifi-
cant basis supported Ms. Van Oster's constitutional challenge to the for-
feiture. 232 
219. Id. 
220. /d. The State sought the forfeiture of the automobile as a common nuisance. /d. 
221. /d. at 465-466. 
222. /d. 
223. /d. 
224. /d. at 466. The Kansas Supreme Court stated, however, that because the legislature 
sought to effectuate a purpose within its power, this civil forfeiture was within the limits of due 
process. /d. at 468. 
225. /d. at 466. 
226. /d. 
227. Id. at 467. 
228. /d. at 467. 
229. /d. at 466. 
230. /d. 
231. /d. 
232. /d. at 469. 
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E. Rejection of the Innocent Owner's Defense 
The innocent owner defense has been uniformly rejected by modern 
American courts adjudicating civil forfeiture cases.233 In Calero-Toledo v. 
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,234 for example, a pleasure yacht was seized 
after the lessees were arrested for transporting controlled substances. 235 
The yacht company challenged the seizure, asserting that it was unaware 
of the lessee's criininal use of the yacht. 236 The yacht company further 
contended that it was unaware of the yacht's seizure, until it attempted to 
repossess the yacht because of past due rent. 237 
The United States District Court held that the Puerto Rican statute 
permitting forfeiture under the circumstances was unconstitutional be-
cause the yacht company was unaware of the criminal conduct which had 
triggered the seizure. 238 The district court also held that the forfeiture stat-
ute unconstitutionally authorized the governmental taking of an innocent 
person's property without just compensation. 239 When the district court 
struck down the statute as unconstitutional, the government appealed di-
rectly to the United States Supreme Court.240 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision, 
stating that forfeiture furthered punitive and deterrent purposes in this 
case, and could withstand the constitutional challenge of an innocent 
owner. 241 As support for its decision, the Supreme Court noted that forfei-
tures were "likely a product of the confluence and merger of the deodand 
tradition and the belief that the right to own property could be denied the 
wrongdoer. "242 
In dicta, the Supreme Court acknowledged that, "it would be difficult 
to reject the constitutional claim of . . . an owner who proved not only 
that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also 
that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the pro-
scribed use of his property."243 The Supreme Court noted that nothing in 
the record indicated that the yacht company had done everything that 
could reasonably have been expected of it to prevent the illegal use of the 
233. See infra notes 234-245 and accompanying text. 
234. 416 U.S. 663 (1974). 
235. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 665 (1974). 
236. !d. at 668. 
237. !d. The government can typically effectuate seizures without affording the owner notice 
and an opportunity to object. Cheh, supra note 8, at 1, 2. 
238. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 669. 
239. !d. 
240. [d. 
241. [d. 
242. Id. at 682. 
243. ld. at 689-690. 
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yacht. 244 Based on this analysis, the Supreme Court reversed the district 
court's decision and ordered the condemnation of the pleasure yacht. 245 
F. Application of the Excessive Fines Clause to Civil Forfeiture 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Excessive Fines 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution ap-
plies to civil forfeiture actions. 246 In Austin v. United States, 247 Richard 
Austin was convicted for the possession of narcotics with the intent to 
distribute, contrary to South Dakota laws. 248 After Mr. Austin pled guilty 
to this charge, the government filed a civil forfeiture action pursuant to 
21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(4) and (a)(7) to seize Mr. Austin's mobile home and 
auto body shop. 249 Mr. Austin challenged the forfeiture, alleging that the 
seizure was a violation of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines 
Clause. 250 
Sioux Falls Police Officer Donald Satterlee signed an affidavit which 
connected Mr. Austin's possession of cocaine to his movements between 
his mobile home and body shop. 251 Based on the support of this affidavit, 
the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota granted 
summary judgment in favor of the government. 252 Mr. Austin appealed 
the district court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit. 253 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed, noting that "the principle of 
proportionality should be applied in civil actions that result in harsh pen-
alties ... and that the government was exacting too high a penalty in rela-
244. !d. at 690. 
245. !d. 
246. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 604 (1993). 
247. !d. 
248. !d. at 603. 
249. !d. at 604. 
250. ld. Chairman Henry Hyde commented that: 
[t]here is little or no proportionality between the crimes alleged and the punishment 
imposed, raising a question, as the U.S. Supreme Court has now recognized, about what 
constitutes "excessive fines" - as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Under asset 
forfeiture, hotels have been taken because gangs used them for drug transactions. 
Apartment houses have been confiscated because drug deals allegedly took place in 
some apartments. Three fraternity houses at the University of Virginia were seized by 
local police based on alleged sales of small quantities of drugs by ;"tudent frat members. 
Hyde, supra note 2, at 7. 
The United States Supreme Court did, however, impose a restriction on the government's forfeiture 
power's under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. Beaver, supra note 4, at 1, 3. 
251. Austin, 509 U.S. at 604. 
252. !d. 
253. [d. 
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tion to the offense committed."254 Subsequent to the Eighth Circuit's af-
firmation of the district court's decision, Mr. Austin appealed to the 
United States Supreme Court.255 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court sought to resolve the 
issue of whether forfeiture was within the purview of the Eighth Amend-
ment's Excessive Fines Clause. 256 The Supreme Court noted that histori-
cally the Eighth Amendment was "intended to prevent the government 
from abusing its power to punish."257 Specifically, the Excessive Fines 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment was designed to limit "the 
Government's power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, 'as 
punishment for some offense.' "258 
The Supreme Court held that because forfeiture serves as monetary 
punishment, "[forfeiture proceedings are] subject to the limitations of the 
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause."259 Even if the forfeiture 
served some remedial purpose, the Court explained, the Eighth Amend-
ment is still implicated if the forfeiture is designed in part to punish the 
owner. 260 Moreover, the Supreme Court noted that sanctions may 
frequently serve multiple purposes.261 The Supreme Court stated, how-
ever, that even if a sanction was partly punitive in nature, the sanction 
could still withstand an Eighth Amendment challenge if it was primarily 
remedial. 262 
The Supreme Court then concluded that forfeiture in general has his-
torically been understood to constitute punishment, and as such is at least 
partly subject to the restrictions of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive 
Fines Clause. 263 The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit, holding 
that the forfeiture of Mr. Austin's mobile home and auto body shop was 
subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines 
Clause. 264 
254. /d. The Eighth Circuit noted "that the penalty imposed was too severe in comparison 
to the magnitude of the crime committed, the court could only reach a split decision." !d. 
255. /d. at 604-605. 
256. /d. at 605. 
257. /d. 
258. /d. at 606. 
259. /d. at 603. 
260. /d. 
261. /d. 
262. Calero, 416 U.S. at 686. 
263. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 602. 
264. Id. at 622. 
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G. Modern Civil Forfeiture 
Civil forfeiture is a desirable tool for law enforcement agencies be-
cause it is quick, easy, and highly profitable.265 On a mere showing of 
probable cause, property may be seized if it constitutes the proceeds of a 
crime or is intended for use in a criminal project. 266 
1. The current burden of proof in civil forfeiture proceedings 
In order to seize property in a civil forfeiture action, the government 
is required to demonstrate that "probable cause" exists. 267 Oftentimes, in 
order to effectuate a civil forfeiture, law enforcement officials rely upon 
probable cause that is "mere rumor, gossip, a police hunch, or self-serv-
ing statements from anonymous paid police informants, from criminals 
cooperating in order to obtain a lighter sentence on pending charges, or 
from incarcerated convicts trying to shorten an existing jail term."268 Af-
ter demonstrating that probable cause exists to seize the property, the bur-
den of proof shifts to the owner of the seized property. 269 The property 
owner must then prove, by a "preponderance of the evidence," that the 
accused property was not used in a criminal act. 270 
2. Counsel for indigent property owners 
Although the Sixth Amendment provides a right to counsel in a crim-
inal proceeding for indigent parties who cannot afford an attorney, no 
such right extends to indigent parties in civil forfeiture actions. 271 Under 
265. Cheh, supra note 8, at 1, 3. 
266. Id. Civil forfeiture may be predicated on probable cause when one person says to 
another, 
"that guy Smith looks like he does drugs. An informant overhears this idle gossip and 
reports it to the police, who in turn seize Smith's residence and start forfeiture 
proceedings. No drugs are found and Smith is never arrested or charged with a crime 
yet. Smith is forced to hire a lawyer and fight in court to get his house back - and 
he and his family, may well be evicted." 
Hyde, supra note 2, at 57. 
Probable cause is defined as "having more evidence for than against. A reasonable ground for 
belief in certain alleged facts. A set of probabilities grounded in the factual and practical 
considerations which govern the decisions of reasonable and prudent persons and is more than 
mere suspicion but less than the quantum of evidence required for conviction." BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1201 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted). 
267. Hyde, supra note 2, at 6. A preponderance of the evidence is defined as "evidence 
which is of greater weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition 
to it; that is, evidence which a~ a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is more probable 
than not." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted). 
268. Hyde, supra note 2, at 7. 
269. Id. 
270. /d. 
271. ld. at 8. 
236 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 11 
current civil forfeiture procedures, a property owner who cannot afford 
an attorney to contest an improper seizure by the government is simply 
"out of luck."272 Representative Elvin Martinez, a member of the Florida 
House of Representatives, has commented that police administrators in 
Florida have "corrupted [civil forfeiture's] legislative purpose and were 
instead using it to harass innocent owners with little or no financial or 
other ability to defend themselves. "273 
Statistics support Representative Martinez's view, demonstrating that 
"the vast majority of forfeitures involve the property of average citizens 
caught in the clutches of this draconian law and its too-eager 
enforcers."274 For example, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") 
released figures for the eighteen months preceding December 1990 show-
ing that only seventeen percent of the 25,297 property items seized by the 
DEAhad a value of over $50,000.275 Such statistics "speak volumes about 
the targets-and victims-of this law."276 
3. Civil forfeiture as a crime-fighting mechanism 
Until the 1980's, the government rarely resorted to the civil forfeiture 
of private property. 277 Since then, however, civil forfeiture has been fre-
quently used as "a weapon in the arsenal of the drug war."278 Currently, 
more than one hundred federal forfeiture statutes exist which address 
both criminal and civil matters. 279 
Civil forfeiture, however, can be distinguished from criminal forfei-
ture. 28° Civil forfeiture is utilized to seize the property of a person not 
involved in a crime whereas criminal forfeiture seizes the property of the 
lawbreaker:281 
[Criminal forfeiture] arises under criminal statutes that allow in 
personam actions against a named criminal defendant. In such 
cases, forfeiture comes about subsequent to and as a punitive 
consequence of the defendant's conviction for specific criminal 
acts, usually as a supplement to other statutory punishment in-
cluding possible incarceration or tines .... The important differ-
272. Id. 
273. Id. at 10-11. 
274. Id. at 11. 
275. !d. 
276. !d. 
277. Id. at 23. 
278. !d. 
279. /d. 
280. /d. at 21. 
281. !d. 
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ence in this procedure compared to civil forfeiture, is that crimi-
nal forfeiture occurs, at least in theory, only after a trial of the 
defendant at which full constitutional and procedural safeguards 
of due process apply. No convictions; no forfeiture. No wrongdo-
ing; no property confiscation. The issue at trial is the individual's 
misconduct, not the fictional guilt of an inanimate object, as in 
civil forfeiture cases. 282 
237 
Thus, an arrest and conviction of the property owner is not required to 
effectuate a civil forfeiture of personal property. 283 
H. A Proposal for Civil Forfeiture Reform 
On June 15, 1993, United States Congressman and Chairman of the 
House Judiciary Committee Henry Hyde (R-IL) introduced a bill entitled 
the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 1993 ("CAPRA") to the House 
of Representatives. 284 Chairman Hyde also introduced the bill to the 
House Judiciary Committee and to the House Ways and Means Commit-
tee on June 22, 1995.285 Chairman Hyde's proposed legislation seeks to 
reform certain statutes governing civil forfeiture. 286 United States Senator 
James J efford (R-VT) introduced an identical version of this bill in the 
Senate. 287 In support of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, Senator 
Jefford stated that, "[t]he terms of the bill are relatively simple, and its 
objectives are modest at best."288 
1. Procedural reform 
Procedurally, Chairman Hyde's proposed legislation notably differs 
from existing civil forfeiture statutes.289 For example, under current law, a 
property owner has ten days to file a claim in a civil forfeiture proceed-
ing.290 Under CAPRA, however, the current time limit would be extended 
to sixty days. 291 Additionally, under the current system, owners of seized 
282. !d. In personam is defined as '"[a)gainst the person." BLACK'S LAW DrcnoNARY 791 
(6th ed. 1990). In personam is an '"[a]ction seeking judgment against a person involving his 
personal rights and based on jurisdiction of his personal rights and based on jurisdiction of his 
person, as distinguished from a judgment against property (i.e. in rem)." !d. 
283. Hyde, supra note 2, at 26. 
284. Levy, supra note 19, at 210. 
285. See generally H.R. 1916, 104th Cong. (1995). 
286. !d. CAPRA would apply to all claims brought on or subsequent to the enactment of the 
Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act. H.R. 1916, 104th Cong. § 9 (1995). 
287. Levy, supra note 19, at 210. 
288. Carpenter, supra note 17, at 1139. 
289. See infra notes 290-309 and accompanying text. 
290. Levy, supra note 19, at 212. 
291. H.R. 1916, 104th Cong. § 3 (1995). 
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property must provide a bond worth ten percent of the value of the confis-
cated property in order to obtain the right to contest the forfeiture. 292 
CAPRA would completely eliminate this bond requirement.293 
Under current law, the government is permitted to commence civil 
forfeiture proceedings, but remains exempt from any liability resulting 
from damage inflicted on the property during the seizure. 294 This exemp-
tion would be eliminated under CAPRA, allowing innocent victims of 
civil forfeiture to hold the government liable for damage done to their 
property while in the government's possession.295 Currently, seized prop-
erty will not be returned to the property owner unless a court adjudicates 
that the seizure was improper, regardless of whether the seizure creates a 
financial hardship for the property owner. 296 CAPRA would permit 
courts, on a demonstration of "substantial hardship," to temporarily re-
turn seized property to the owner while a final judicial resolution is pend-
ing. 297 
2. Altering the burden of proof in civil forfeiture proceedings 
Under current law, the burden of proof rests with property owners to 
demonstrate that their property has not been utilized in the commission of 
a crime, and as such is not seizable under civil forfeiture statutes.298 Un-
der this burden, "[t]he law reverses the normal presumption of innocence, 
presuming the property 'guilty' unless the owner can prove otherwise."299 
CAPRA, however, would alter the current burden of proof, placing the 
burden on the government to prove that the property was properly 
seized. 300 
Additional differences exist between current forfeiture law and 
Chairman Hyde's proposed legislation.301 For example, under CAPRA, 
the government would be required to demonstrate that the seizure of the 
property was lawful by "clear and convincing evidence," rather than by 
the "preponderance of the evidence" standard currently required of a 
property owner.302 Under the clear and convincing standard proposed by 
292. Levy. supra note 19, at 212. This bond, however, must not be less than $250 or more 
than $5000, and is used to cover court and storage costs in case the government wins. /d. 
293. Td. 
294. /d. 
295. H.R. 1916, 104th Cong. § 2 (1995). 
296. Levy, supra note 19, at 212. 
297. !d. at 212-13. 
298. Hyde, supra note 2, at 55. 
299. /d. 
300. H.R. 1916, 104th Cong. § 615 (1995). 
301. See infra notes 302-309 and accompanying text. 
302. H.R. 1916 104th Cong. § 615 (1995). Clear and convincing proof can be defined as 
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Chairman Hyde, "[t]he government would be required to prove (1) that 
the unlawful act on which the forfeiture is based actually did occur and 
(2) that a sufficient nexus exists between the property to be seized and the 
alleged unlawful act."303 A clear and convincing standard would provide 
that these two requirements be satisfied before a seizure could be consid-
ered proper. 304 
3. Court-appointed representation 
Currently, a property owner has no constitutional right to court-ap-
pointed counsel in a civil forfeiture proceeding. 305 Thus, a property owner 
who is financially unable to obtain legal representation may be unable to 
contest a forfeiture. 306 Consequently, indigent property owners may be 
forced to forfeit their property, regardless of whether their property was 
improperly seized.307 In contrast, CAPRA would provide court-appointed 
counsel to represent indigent property owners who claim that the forfei-
ture of their property was improper. 308 In addition to providing court-ap-
pointed counsel, CAPRA would require that such counsel be compen-
sated from the Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund. 309 
IV. ANALYSIS 
When John Bennis was arrested for his acts of gross indecency inside 
the Bennis family car, the state initiated a civil forfeiture action and 
seized the automobile. 310 Tina Bennis claimed that her property interest in 
the automobile should not have been forfeited because she was unaware 
of her husband's criminal activities. 311 However, the Michigan District 
Court determined that the automobile could be seized because it consti-
tuted an abatable nuisance. 312 Tina Bennis appealed the district court's 
decision. 313 
"[t]hat proof which results in reasonable certainty of the truth of the ultimate fact in controversy." 
BlACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 251 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted). 
303. Hyde, supra note 2, at 59. 
304. !d. 
305. !d. at 81. 
306. !d. 
307. !d. at 59. 
308. H.R. 1916, 104th Cong. § 608 (1995). 
309. !d. 
310. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 996. 
311. !d. at 997. A commentator has suggested that there has never been a more sympathetic 
Petitioner to come before the United States Supreme Court. Savage, supra note 33, at 47. 
312. Bennis, 116 S. Ct.. at 997. 
313. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d at 732. 
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On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the district 
court's decision, holding that the civil forfeiture of the automobile was 
improper. 314 The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, 
affirmed the district court's decision, and noted that the Bennis family car 
was an abatable nuisance as a matter of law.315 Tina Bennis subsequently 
appealed the Michigan Supreme Court's decision to the United States 
Supreme Court. 316 The United States Supreme Court rejected Tina 
Bennis' constitutional challenges, and approved the forfeiture of the auto-
mobi1e.317 
A The Development of Civil Forfeiture Law As Applicable to Bennis 
I. Focusing on the property, not the property owner 
The law of civil forfeiture, like the law of deodands, focuses on the 
property of the owner, not the owner's guilt or innocence. 318 For example, 
in The Palmyra, 319 the United States Supreme Court rejected the property 
owners' assertion that they were innocent, holding that "the thing" is the 
primary offender and that the offense is attached to "the thing. "320 In ad-
dition, the United States Supreme Court addressed the innocent owner 
defense in Harmony v. United States. 321 Although the government con-
ceded that Mr. Harmony never contemplated or authorized the criminal 
acts of the vessel's captain, the Supreme Court nevertheless held that the 
law does not focus on the property owner, but rather on the guilt of the 
vessel or thing. 322 
2. Labeling the object as the "guilty" thing 
Historical precedent controlling civil forfeiture is grounded in the 
need to punish and deter piracy as demonstrated in the cases of The Pal-
myra313 and Harmony v. United States. 324 In both cases, vessels were 
seized because of piratical aggression. 325 Under the theory that the vessel, 
314. Bennts, 116 S. Ct. at 997. 
315. /d. The Michigan Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals assertion that in order 
to ahate an automobile, the state must prove that the owner consented to the criminal use of the 
vehicle. /d. 
316. !d. at 997. 
317. /d. at 1000-01. 
318. Levy, supra note 19, at 17, 19. 
319. 25 U.S. l (1827). 
320. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 14. 
321. 43 u.s. 210, 233 (1844). 
322. /d. 
323. 25 U.S. 1 (1827). 
324. 43 U.S. at 229. 
325. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 1; Harmony, 43 U.S. at 229. 
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as well as the individual directing the vessel, helped facilitate the crime 
of piracy, the court in Harmony found that once the vessel was seized, its 
captain could no longer engage in piratical aggression. 326 As the United 
States Supreme Court noted in The Palmyra, "[t]he thing is here primar-
ily considered as the offender, or rather the offense is attached primarily 
to the thing. "327 
In The Palmyra and Harmony, the vessels were seized irrespective of 
the owner's innocence.328 However, rational reasons supported this forfei-
ture, because in those times a ship could travel halfway around the world 
to escape the then limited reach of justice. 329 The owners, falsely claiming 
they were ignorant of any criminal activity, could then continue to pirate 
with impunity. 330 In Bennis, however, an automobile does not facilitate 
the crime of soliciting prostitution in the same manner as a vessel facili-
tates piratical aggression. 331 Nor was the car a "necessary element" of the 
crime in Bennis; in fact, the solicitation could have occurred anywhere. 332 
Unlike the captains in Harmony or The Palmyra, John Bennis did not 
need a car to perpetrate his criminal act. 333 
Similar to the admiralty cases, the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed the need for civil forfeiture when the use of real property consti-
tuted an element of the crime. 334 For example, in Dobbins's Distillery v. 
United States, 335 the Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture of an illegally 
operated distillery because it constituted an element of the crime. 336 In 
Bennis, however, the operation of the car did not constitute an element of 
the crime, as the operation of the distillery did in Dobbins's Distillery. 337 
Because no direct correlation existed between the crime of solicitation of 
prostitution and the operation of a motor vehicle, the forfeiture of the 
Bennis car would not prevent John Bennis' crime from recurring. 338 
326. Harmony, 43 U.S. at 233-34. 
327. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14. The United States Supreme Court in The Palmyra 
acknowledged that it is unfair to punish the innocent, but relied on Congress' significant goal of 
destroying the means to facilitate crime. Harmony, 43 U.S. at 227 (citations omitted). 
328. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 17; Harmony, 43 U.S. at 211. 
329. See supra notes 154-188 and accompanying text. 
330. !d. 
331. See supra notes 91-94, 323-327 and accompanying text. 
332. !d. 
333. !d. 
334. See infra notes 323-333; 335-338 and accompanying text. 
335. 96 U.S. 395 (1877). 
336. Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 394, 404 (1877). 
337. See supra notes 91-94, 189-201 and accompanying text. 
338. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1004, 1007 (1996). 
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3. Rejecting the innocent owner's defense and justifying civil forfeiture 
In the past seventy-five years, courts have continually rejected prop-
erty owner's assertions that they should be insulated against forfeiture 
through an innocent owner's defense. 339 In both J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-
Grant Co. v. United States340 and Van Oster v. Kansas, 341 vehicles were 
forfeited for illegally transporting moonshine. 342 Similarly, in Calera-To-
ledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,343 a leased yacht was forfeited when 
the lessee was caught transporting controlled substances.344 In all three 
cases, the property owners challenged the forfeiture on constitutional 
grounds because they lacked knowledge of the criminal acts. 345 
In Goldsmith-Grant, the United States Supreme Court concluded that 
because the car was used to facilitate the crime, it was a proper object of 
forfeiture, regardless of the property owner's innocence.346 Moreover, the 
Supreme Court held that the car was properly confiscated because the 
forfeiture prevented the recurrence of the crime.347 Similarly, the automo-
bile in Bennis was forfeited, however, transportation was not an element 
of the crime and forfeiture would not have prevented the crime from re-
curring.348 In fact, John Bennis was sighted in the area reputed for prosti-
tution on two prior occasions; neither incident involved the use of the 
family car. 349 As Justice John Paul Stevens noted in his dissenting opin-
ion, "[a]n isolated misuse of a stationary vehicle should not justify the 
forfeiture of an innocent owner's property on the theory that it constituted 
an instrumentality of the crime. "350 
In Calera-Toledo, the United States Supreme Court stated in dicta 
that a constitutional challenge by an innocent owner would be difficult to 
disregard when his or her property had been seized under the civil forfei-
ture statutes if that owner was entirely without culpability and had taken 
reasonable precautions to prevent the criminal activity. 351 Such dicta im-
plicitly: 
339. See infra notes 340- 355 and accompanying text. 
340. 254 u.s. 505 (1921). 
341. 272 U.S. 465 (1926). 
342. Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 466; J.W. Goldsmith Jr.-Grant Co., 254 U.S. at 508. 
343. 416 U.S. 663 (1974). 
344. /d. 
345. See supra notes 203-245 and accompanying text. 
346. J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co, 254 U.S. at 512-13. 
347. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. 
348. See supra notes 334-338 and accompanying text. Additionally, the United States 
Supreme Court noted that Congress' intentions were to condemn the interests of guilty individuals, 
not to foJteit the property of a guiltless owner. J.W. Goldsmith Jr.-Grant Co., 254 U.S. at 510. 
349. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1007. 
350. !d. at 1005. 
351. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689-90. 
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recognizes that where the forfeiture statute at issue serves puni-
tive purposes, the State may not forfeit property on the basis of 
its misuse by another person, unless the owner had some culpa-
bility at least amounting to negligence in connection with the 
unlawful use. The principle implicit in the dicta-that the State 
has no legitimate interest in punishing one who is entirely inno-
cent .... 352 
243 
The Court in Bennis nevertheless followed its "long and unbroken line" 
of precedent, failing to consider what is regarded as "logic, equity, or the 
practical needs of a modern society."353 Although a "long and unbroken 
line" of cases involving civil forfeiture remains, Bennis is neither a lineal 
descendant nor first cousin to the historical precedent relied upon by the 
majority. 354 Moreover, the doctrine of deodands, similar to the doctrine of 
civil forfeiture, "was a tissue of legal fictions and contradictions. It was 
also unjust to its core. "355 
B. Adopting the Bennis Dissent's Analysis 
Throughout American history, automobiles have been seized when 
transportation was a factor facilitating the criminal offense, such as the 
transportation of moonshine or controlled substances. 356 In Bennis, how-
ever, the automobile bears no rational relationship to the crime commit-
ted; indeed, although the crime occurred in the automobile, the Bennis 
family car was not necessary to effectuate the crime. 357 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens criticized the Michigan Su-
preme Court's opinion that the character of the neighborhood in which 
the criminal offense occurred justified seizing the car as a contribution to 
an ongoing "nuisance condition."358 Based on this theory, Justice Stevens 
concluded that the very same car, parked in a more affluent neighborhood 
in suburban Detroit, would not be subject to forfeiture. 359 Thus, Justice 
Stevens criticized the notion that these same criminal acts would not cre-
ate an "ongoing nuisance condition" in a distinguished neighborhood. 360 
352. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729). 
353. Hyde, supra note 2, at 71. 
354. Id; See supra notes 310-353 and accompanying text. 
355. Levy, supra note 19, at 19. 
356. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1006. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
357. /d. 
358. /d. at 1006 n.9. It is difficult to confiscate real property when there is no real 
connection between the crime and the property. /d. (citations omitted). 
359. /d. at 1006 n.9. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
360. /d. 
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Justice Stevens also questioned the State's argument that the forfei-
ture was not punitive because the goal of this forfeiture was to abate a 
nuisance. 361 Although the majority conceded that the forfeiture, at least in 
part, punished the innocent owner, Justice Stevens maintained that the 
principal aim of the forfeiture was punishment. 362 Even assuming that 
forfeiture may occasionally serve a remedial end by deterring future crim-
inal conduct, forfeiture of the Bennis car would not have prevented a re-
occurrence of this criminal act. 363 As John Bennis' behavior 
demonstrates, this crime could have been committed anywhere. 364 In fact, 
witnesses testified at trial that John Bennis was seen at least twice during 
the previous summer soliciting prostitutes on foot without the use of 
car.365 
Thus, Justice Stevens concluded that because the principal aim of the 
forfeiture was punitive, the majority erred in affirming the Michigan Su-
preme Court. 366 Justice Stevens asserted that Tina Bennis had done noth-
ing to warrant such punishment. 367 In his dissenting opinion, Justice 
Stevens argued that the forfeiture of the Bennises automobile was an arbi-
trary deprivation of an innocent woman's property without due process of 
law.368 Thus, the state utilized its forfeiture powers to arbitrarily and ineq-
uitably confiscate Tina Bennis' property interest in the Bennis family 
car. 369 
C. Justice Stevens' Three Category Approach 
In his dissenting opinion in Bennis, Justice Stevens stated that prop-
erty subject to forfeiture can be divided into three separate categories: 
"pure contraband, proceeds of criminal activity, and tools of the criminal 
trade.'mo The first category, pure contraband, covers objects where mere 
possession would amount to a per se criminal violation. 371 Examples in-
clude smuggled goods, narcotics, and adulterated food. 372 The Bennis car, 
361. Id. 
362. ld. at 1006-7. 
363. ld. at 1007. 
364. Id. 
365. Id. Under this nuisance analysis, the car would no longer be considered a nuisance once 
it leaves the neighborhood. Id. at 1006 n.9. 
366. !d. at 1009-10. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
367. ld. at 1009. 
368. ld. 
369. See supra notes 384-388 and accompanying text. 
370. ld. 
371. ld. 
372. ld. The Government has a remedial interest in removing these items from circulation 
because they are dangerous or harmful. ld. 
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however, does not fit into the first category because the mere possession 
of an automobile is not a crime. 373 
The second category, proceeds of criminal activity, historically has 
denoted stolen property. 374 However, federal statutes have dramatically 
broadened this category to enable the government to seize money earned 
through criminal means. 375 Examples include a piece of property 
purchased with drug money or an asset acquired through the means of 
embezzlement.376 However, the Bennis family car was not purchased by 
such ill-gotten gains. 377 
The third category, instrumentalities utilized in the commission of a 
crime, includes items such as yachts, airplanes, and automobiles. 378 Typi-
cally, the government has difficulty justifying forfeitures for items not 
utilized in the commission of a crime because the remedial interest in 
confiscation is less obvious. 379 For example, the early cases involving 
civil forfeiture primarily targeted pirate ships engaged in trading slaves 
and smuggling goods. 380 As a result, the forfeiture of these vessels was 
approved by the courts, regardless of whether the owner knew of the 
criminal activity. 381 Thus, under admiralty law, the ship itself was consid-
ered the offender.382 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens criticized 
the majority's application of admiralty cases to the Bennis case because 
the law demonstrated in the case precedent presumes that an owner is 
aware of the principal use of his property. 383 
Tina Bennis, however, testified that she was completely unaware of 
any criminal use of the Pontiac by her husband. 384 In fact, she expected 
him to "come directly home from work," as was his normal routine. 385 
When John Bennis failed to come home on the night of his arrest, Tina 
Bennis even called "Missing Persons."386 As Tina Bennis' testimony was 
uncontradicted and inherently credible, she demonstrated that she was 
"[w]ithout knowledge that [John Bennis] would commit such an act in the 
family car, or that he had ever done so previously, [and] surely [Tina 
373. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text. 
374. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1004. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
375. /d. 
376. !d. The return of such property has an important "restitutionary justification." !d. 
377. !d. at 1008. 
378. /d. at 1010. 
379. /d. at 1004. 
380. /d. at 1004-1005. 
381. !d. at 1005. 
382. /d. 
383. !d. 
384. !d. at 1008. 
385. /d. 
386. /d. 
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Bennis] cannot be accused of failing to take 'reasonable steps' to prevent 
the illicit behavior."387 Tina Bennis is as innocent as if a thief had stolen 
the Pontiac and used it criminally. 388 
D. Austin: The Punishment Should Be Proportionate to the Crime 
The United States Supreme Court recently held, in Austin v. United 
States,389 that the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause applies to 
civil forfeitures. 390 In Austin, the Supreme Court demonstrated support for 
a constitutional limitation on civil forfeiture by acknowledging that for-
feiture has historically served to punish the criminally culpable.391 Fur-
ther, the Supreme Court recognized that civil forfeiture, in certain cir-
cumstances, may be so disproportionate to the crime committed that it 
violates the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. 392 
In addition, United States Congressman and Chairman of the House 
Judiciary Committee Henry Hyde (R-IL) has explained that the confisca-
tion of a family home would be disproportionate to the crime committed 
when only one family member had stolen items worth less than $500.393 
Using Chairman Hyde's reasoning, the Bennis family car should not have 
been confiscated simply because one act of prostitution occurred in the 
car. 394 
Applying the due process principles articulated in Austin and the ra-
tionale asserted by Chairman Hyde, logic would dictate that forfeiture of 
the $600 Pontiac was disproportionate and inequitable because it was, in 
effect, punishment for Tina Bennis' husband's conduct, of which she was 
completely unaware. 395 The forfeiture of Tina Bennis' property interest is 
punishment for her husband's conduct; conduct of which she was com-
pletely unaware. 396 Although Tina Bennis consented to her husband's use 
of the family car to commute to work, that consent is such that "even a 
modest penalty is out of all proportion to her blameworthiness; and when 
the assessment is the confiscation of the entire car, simply because [one] 
387. !d. 
388. See supra notes 393-397 and accompanying text. 
389. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993). 
390. !d. at 2803. 
391. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1010. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
392. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804-06. 
393. Hyde, supra note 2, at 13. 
394. See supra note 393 and accompanying text. 
395. Brief for Petitioner at 10-11, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729); 
See supra notes 393-397 and accompanying text. 
396. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1010. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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illicit act took place once in the driver's seat, the punishment is plainly 
excessive. "397 
E. Lack of Fundamental Fairness 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens stated that "[f]undamental 
fairness prohibits the punishment of innocent people. "398 Fundamental 
fairness also militates against the forfeiture of an innocent owner's prop-
erty. 399 When the majority revisited historical precedent, it held that its 
early forfeiture decisions were based on the theory of negligent entrust-
ment. 400 This theory is based on the inference that the owner negligently 
allowed the property to be misused. 401 Under this analysis, the majority 
stated that the owner is properly punishable through forfeiture for this 
negligence. 402 Here, however, the State conceded that Tina Bennis was in 
no way negligent in entrusting the family car to John Bennis. 403 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas criticized the ma-
jority, noting that if "[i]mproperly used, forfeitures could become more 
like a roulette wheel employed to raise revenue from innocent, but hap-
less owners whose property is unforeseeably misused, or a tool wielded 
to punish those who associate with criminals, than a component of a sys-
tem of justice. "404 Tina Bennis, as an innocent co-owner whose car was 
seized as a result of her husband's criminal acts, experienced the inequi-
ties of the roulette wheel phenomenon which concerned Justice 
Thomas. 405 In fact, "[civil forfeiture] law today is being used across the 
nation to make a mockery of our rights to property and due process and is 
now reaching well beyond the war on drugs."406 
F. The Goal Of Civil Forfeiture Reform 
1. Eliminating profitability as the sole motivation for civil forfeiture 
Many civil forfeiture actions are now "unrelenting governmental as-
saults on property rights, fueled by a dangerous and emotional vigilante 
mentality that sanctions shredding the U.S. Constitution into meaningless 
397. ld. 
398. I d. at 1007. 
399. ld. at 1007-08. 
400. Id. at 1007. 
401. ld. 
402. ld. 
403. Jd. at 1003. 
404. Id. (emphasis added) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
405. ld. See supra note 404 and accompanying text. 
406. Hyde, supra note 2, at vii. 
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confetti."407 Thus, one of the primary objectives of civil forfeiture reform 
should be to stop the '"pillage and plunder' mentality of greed ... "408 
This attitude is a direct result of the "easy money temptation offered by 
the current civil asset forfeiture laws. "409 Under current civil forfeiture 
law, the government has the power to confiscate the property of private 
citizens, sell it, and retain the proceeds. 410 Through the use of civil forfei-
ture, the government has devised an unlimited source of revenue which 
lacks legislative oversight. 411 Thus, civil forfeiture reform should create 
legislative oversight for the seizure of property and the expenditure of 
monies retained from the sale proceeds. 412 
2. Rebalancing the scales of justice 
The presumption of innocence is one of "the most vital and treasured 
tenets of United States criminal law."413 This presumption is the popular 
embodiment of the due process rights guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution.414 The presumption of innocence has been increasingly un-
dermined by the government's abusive use of civil forfeiture. 415 Under 
current civil forfeiture laws, property owners have the burden of proving, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the forfeiture of their property 
was improper. 416 Sustaining that burden has proven to be an unreasonable 
hardship on property owners. 417 Property owners find it nearly impossible 
to produce documentation or other evidence which can demonstrate that 
the "property was never used . . . to 'facilitate' the commission of a 
crime. "418 Thus, a property owner is essentially required to prove a nega-
tive. 419 This burden, as most property owners have discovered, is nearly 
insurmountable. 420 
407. ld. at 1. 
408. ld. at 33. 
409. ld. 
410. ld. at 51-52. The vessel or object which "corrunits the aggression is treated as the 
offender as the guilty instrument or thing to which the forfeiture attaches, without reference 
what~oever to the character or conduct of the owner." Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1005 n5. (citations 
omitted). 
411. Hyde, supra note 2, at 51. 
412. See infra notes 444-447 and accompanying text. 
413. Levy, supra note 19, at 210-11. 
414. ld. at 211. 
415. ld. 
416. ld. 
417. Hyde, supra note 2, at 56. 
418. ld. 
419. Id. 
420. Id. An innocent property owner is faced with "extreme difficulty, if not impossibility 
proving such a negative, which the government, as accuser, has easy access to proof of the 
property's use in criminal activity-if indeed such proof really does exist." /d. 
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As a general rule of American jurisprudence, the burden of proof is 
allocated to the party who has the "more easily available means of 
proof."421 Arguably, however, property owners do not have a "more eas-
ily available means of proof," because they often do not have the 
resources necessary to meet this burden. 422 Thus, the burden of proof un-
fairly rests on the property owner.423 This burden should be shifted to the 
party who can best shoulder such a burden, the government. 424 
Judge C. Arlen Beam of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit has commented on the inequitable burden of proof which 
rests on property owners. 425 Judge Beam said the following: 
The current allocations of burdens and standards of proof require 
that the [owner] prove a negative, that the property was not used 
in order to facilitate illegal activity, while the government must 
prove almost nothing. This creates a great risk of erroneous, irre-
versible deprivation [of property] .... The allocation of burdens 
and standards of proof ... is of great importance because it de-
cides who must go forward with evidence and who bears the risk 
of loss should proof not rise to the standard set. In civil forfeiture 
cases, where owners are required to go forward with evidence 
and exculpate their property by a preponderance of the evidence, 
all risks are squarely on the owner. The government, under the 
current approach, need not produce any admissible evidence and 
may deprive citizens of property based on the rankest of hearsay 
and the flimsiest evidence. This result clearly does not reflect the 
value of private property in our society, and makes the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation intolerable. 426 
Thus, civil forfeiture reform is necessary to "rebalance the scales of 
Justice" and to protect property owners from governmental abuse. 427 Past 
civil forfeiture abuses necessitate the implementation of civil forfeiture 
reform which is fair to property owners, yet at the same time preserves 
the forfeiture procedures which are necessary to combat criminal activ-
ity. 428 
421. !d. 
422. See supra notes 413-421 and accompanying footnotes. 
423. !d. 
424. Hyde, supra note 2, at 56. 
425. ld. at 57. 
426. Hyde, supra note 2, at 56. 
427. ld. at 59. 
428. !d. at 80. 
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G. Implementing Civil Forfeiture Reform 
1. Chairman hyde's civil asset forfeiture reform act ( "CAFRA ") 
As Chairman Henry Hyde has noted, the first step in reforming civil 
forfeiture "is easily identifiable, a giant step for property rights, a reform 
every commentator and relevant interest group has recommended without 
exception: shift the burden of evidentiary proof in any judicial proceed-
ing involving forfeiture. "429 Under CAFRA, the government would be 
required to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the illegal 
conduct on which the forfeiture is premised actually occurred and that a 
sufficient nexus exists between the property and the unlawful act. 430 In 
addition, CAFRA would standardize the innocent owner's defense, mak-
ing it easier for property owners to "demonstrate 'either' that [they] did 
not know of 'or' consent to the illegal activity."431 
Under current forfeiture procedures, indigent property owners do not 
have a constitutional right to court-appointed counsel. 432 This omission in 
current civil forfeiture law may explain why so few forfeitures are chal-
lenged. 433 Many property owners do not have the financial resources nec-
essary to hire a lawyer to fight the forfeiture. 434 In fact, property owners 
may decide that their property is not worth the money they would be 
forced to pay to attain legal representation.435 
Under Chairman Hyde's proposed legislation, legal representation 
would be provided for individuals who lack the financial resources neces-
sary to obtain independent legal representation.436 CAFRA would also 
eliminate the current bond requirement because it is inequitable as ap-
plied to indigent property owners and serves no real purpose in other 
cases. 437 Willie Jones, a black Tennessee nurseryman, had $9600 seized 
because he allegedly tit the description of a drug courier. 438 Even though 
his money was improperly seized, Willie Jones was nearly forced to for-
feit his money because he did not have the financial resources necessary 
to post the required ten percent bond.439 Luckily, a reputable attorney 
429. Jd. at 55. 
430. ld. at 81. 
431. Levy, supra note 19, at 212. 
432. Hyde, supra note 2, at 81. 
433. !d. 
434. ld. 
435. !d. 
436. See supra notes 308-309 and accompanying text. 
437. Hyde, supra note 2, at 81. 
438. Levy, supra note 19, at 3-4. 
439. /d. 
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learned of the civil forfeiture abuse and volunteered his assistance to 
Willie Jones. 440 
CAPRA would further extend the time period for filing a claim to 
recover property from ten to sixty days. 441 Finally, CAPRA would protect 
innocent property owners. 442 By providing that property used to facilitate 
a crime may be confiscated unless the violation was "committed ... with-
out the knowledge or consent of the owner," CAPRA unequivocally 
states that a lack of consent, coupled with reasonable efforts to avoid the 
illegal activity, may constitute a valid defense to a civil forfeiture. 443 
2. Legislative oversight 
Under current forfeiture procedures, law enforcement agencies are 
not required to report expenditures from asset forfeiture revenue. 444 These 
agencies should, however, be subjected to "annual authorization and ap-
propriation bills passed by the Congress."445 Such legislative oversight 
would charge legislators with public accountability for the use of civil 
forfeiture and would operate to deter egregious civil forfeiture abuses. 446 
In fact, Justice Thomas noted in Bennis that "[l]egislators, not the 
courts ... have 'the primary responsibility for avoiding [inequitable civil 
forfeiture] result[ s].' "447 
H. Civil Forfeiture Reform As Applied To Bennis 
Innocent property owners, such as Tina Bennis, would clearly benefit 
from the implementation of civil forfeiture reform.448 Specifically, 
CAPRA would have protected Tina Bennis from civil forfeiture on sev-
eral different fronts. 449 For example, CAPRA would have provided Tina 
Bennis with court-appointed counseV50 Moreover, CAPRA would codify 
an innocent owner's defense which would have shielded Tina Bennis 
from the forfeiture of her interest in the Bennis family car.451 Finally, un-
der CAPRA, Tina Bennis could have petitioned the court to temporarily 
return the Pontiac due to "substantial hardship" pending a final judicial 
440. /d. 
441. Hyde, supra note 2, at 82. 
442. /d. at 81. 
443. ld. 
444. /d. at 66. 
445. /d. 
446. /d. 
447. Savage, supra note 311, at 48. 
448. See supra notes 289-309 and accompanying text. 
449. /d. 
450. See supra notes 305-309 and accompanying text. 
451. See supra notes 430-431 and accompanying text. 
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disposition. 452 Thus, Tina Bennis would have benefited if CAFRA had 
been adopted prior to the commencement of the Bennis litigation. 453 
V. CoNcLUSION 
As Justice Stevens wrote in his dissenting op1mon in Bennis, 
"[f]undamental fairness prohibits the punishment of innocent people."454 
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Bennis v. Michigan, 455 is 
inequitable and a derogation of principles of fundamental fairness. In 
Bennis, John and Tina Bennis co-owned a 1977 Pontiac. The Pontiac was 
seized when John Bennis used the car as the location for engaging in sex-
ual relations with a known prostitute. Tina Bennis challenged the forfei-
ture because she was unaware of her husband's illicit conduct. The Su-
preme Court, however, upheld the forfeiture of the automobile, despite 
Tina Bennis' complete lack of crilninal culpability. The Bennis decision 
is inequitable because Tina Bennis was entirely innocent, and therefore, 
not properly punishable. 
The Bennis decision gives the government the power to take an inno-
cent owner's property under the pretext of abating a nuisance. Under 
Bennis, the government is further empowered to arbitrarily declare any-
thing a nuisance and to punish innocent individuals. The government may 
now set its sights on an ideal piece of property and effectively seize such 
property under the guise of civil forfeiture power. In fact, "[a] land grab 
described as part of the war against drugs would be [an ideal] official 
cover for a city that wanted to build a freeway off-ramp ... without pay-
ing land acquisition costs."456 Donald Scott knows this only too well -
his only crime was owning million dollar property in which the govern-
ment was interested. Civil forfeiture law also empowers the government 
to seize an innocent owner's property for merely associating with a crilni-
nal. Adequate parameters no longer lilnit the application of civil forfei-
ture. 
Congressman Henry Hyde has proposed the Civil Asset Forfeiture 
Reform Act in an effort to elilninate civil forfeiture abuses. This act, if 
passed, would provide lilnitations on civil forfeiture, thereby making it a 
useful and effective doctrine, instead of a profit-seeking law enforcement 
tool. CAFRA would place the burden of proof on the State, rather than on 
452. See supra notes 296-297 and accompanying text. 
453. See supra notes 289-309 and accompanying text. 
454. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1007; Savage, supra note at 47. 
455. 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996). 
456. Hyde, supra note 2, at 63. 
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property owners, thereby safeguarding property owners against the arbi-
trary seizure of their property. CAPRA would also provide court-
appointed counsel for property owners with limited financial resources. 
Thus, CAPRA would enable indigent property owners to contest a suspi-
cious seizure. CAPRA would also completely eliminate the current bond 
requirement. In addition, CAPRA would allow the courts to temporarily 
return seized property to property owners on a showing of substantial 
hardship pending a final judicial resolution. Thus, Chairman Hyde's bill 
would provide a useful curb on the government's insatiable appetite for 
confiscating private property, while maintaining civil forfeiture as a 
crime-fighting mechanism. 
Passionate individuals must speak up in order to protect their consti-
tutional rights and to persuade Congress to act. Civil forfeiture abuses 
jeopardize the fundamental rights that most Americans cherish, but often 
take for granted. As Justice Thomas stated in his concurring opinion in 
Bennis, although punishing an innocent owner appears to be unfair, "this 
case is a reminder that the Constitution does not prohibit everything that 
is intensely undesirable."457 Tina Bennis learned this first-hand. Unless 
civil forfeiture reform occurs, you could be the next victim of the govern-
ment's greed. 
Charlena Toro 
457. Savage, supra note 33, at 47. 
